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ef the preparation. that wemt into the adoption of the formula 
f'ollewea by a desoriptiG:m. of' the mechanics of the formula. 
'i'he de:teets a:r tla.e formula are viewed f'roiji tlaree general 
aspeot8. Dt Chapter III, two aspect8 are taken. up, one of 
wlliclii is am analysis fr0m ~he :r;>oint of view ot statistical. 
theory, partioularl.y the theory of' index numbers. 'i'he other 
is an e:x:am.imatien of the relationshi:p "betwee:a the fermula, and 
the oomcil.it.ieu pertainililg to the supply of" and the demand for 
milk. :Ill Olilapter IV, tlle third ~;J.spect is taken up which is 
a review of the effects that the formula has produced o:a the 
supply of' and the demand for Ddlk along with a:a appraisal. o:r 
the in.dividual. positions of' the producers, handlers, ana eo:a-
sumers under the formula. 
fte criteria for criticizing this f'ormttla are based par-
tiall.y on the objectives set fort1il ey the framers of tl!le for-
mula. These ebjeetives are stated in Chapter n. However,;. 
the authar has f'oUBd that t:here is a basic ineom.site:ae<J' in 
these objectives and ha,j eonsequentl.y eliminated one ot tll.~ 
objectives. '.rhis objective deals with .the ttmai:atenanee of .... 
producer price~ and incomes at a satisfactory level relative to 
gemeral eeo:m.omie eonditia~a.~ ~e main concern of' the author 
is the proper allocation of our resources and not the mainte-
nanee of producer i:m.comes at any eost to the rest of society. 
The desirea bala~ee ~etween the supply of and the dema:m.a for 
milk as stated by the framers of the formula is believed to 
be in accordance with the proper al.locatio:a of our reseurees. 
T1ilere is an outstanding difficulty eneount.ered in an.alyzin · 
3 
the formula. This d.ifficul ty is that not enough is known ab(l)ut 
the responses of producers and consumers to price changes. Tbis 
not only renders difficulties in analyzins the formula but also 
leads one to believe that pricing of milk by any kind of a for-
mula is a highly debatable matter. All that one can do is to 
relate the elements of the formula to tke known supply and de-
mand conditions and from this hope to determine whetker pricin~ 
by the formula is practicable from the point of view of realizing 
a desired balance between the supply of and the demand for milk • 
.ADotaer difficulty is t .hat the milk industry is a dynamic 
one. Many factors such as variable weather conditions, techno-
logical improTements, and frictions witk adjacent markets make 
it difficult to arrive at a conclusiTe and accurate analysis. 
The author accepts the fact that the formula in question 
has brought order to the matter of price control in the Boston 
milksb.ed. That this formula is superior to preTious formulas 
or previous methods for pricing Class I milk is not denied. 
HOWeTer, this is not belieTed to be an a«equate criterion. .The 
formula, if it is to remain in force, should implement the laws 
of supply and demand in such a way as to fulfill the desired 
balance between the demand for and the supply of milk as stated 
by the framers of the formula. This balance, as under competi-
tive conditions should be attained by prices that will cause 
the entrance or exit of firms in and out. of the dairy industry 
or cause an increase or curtailment of production on the part 
of already existing firms. 
Whether there should be government regulation of the milk 
industpy is no longer eons~derea a debatable question by the 
industry or public. The need for seme governmental control of 
milk prices has now been recegmtzed by proaueers, hanilers and 
e0nsumers. 'fhese groups have virt,ually insisted that the go-
vernment step in to ef'feet.uate eontrqls over milk prices. ~e 
important problem then remains o:f fiRding tke best possible 
control measures. 
There are several eeonamie reasons that contribute to tbe 
impraetibility o~ the pricing o'f milk under eompetiti0n. ~e 
milk industry is ehar~eterized by a large number of producers 
supplying milk, a relatively $IIlall num'ber of hB.E.dlers a:m.<i ma.Dy 
eensumers. If the produeers are unorganized, the lil.andlers, whe 
are in an oligoponistie position, kave the possibility of dic-
1 tating priees to the proaue~rs to a considerable extent. How-
ever, if' the producers are well organized, collective bargaining 
can take place and tlil.is can very well be at the expense of' the 
e0nsumer. In eitJaer situat.ie:n the co:m.sum.er is likely to· be in 
a ~isadvantageous position. 
T.he production of' milk on :farms lilas :a.ot as yet lelilt . itself 
to large seale operations. In 1948 tl!lere was 8.ll avera~ of.J.3, 
023 :produeers supplying the Gr·eater Boston milk marketing a.rea.1 
as compared to an average Gf' 59 pool handlers. 2 There has, kow-
eve·r been a downward tre:m.d in. botJa tlile number of prGdueers and 
1. Mmual. :Bostolll Milk Market statistic-s of the Year 1948, 
Market Adliiinistrator, p. 4. · 
~. Ibid. , P·· 3,; 
5 
and handlers. In 1938 there was an average of 15,218 producers! 
as compared to an ayerage of 123 pool handlers. 2 The ratio 
of producers to handlers has changed very little in this ten-year 
period. Ill 1938 the number of handlers was 0.5% of the number 
of producers as compared to o.S% in 1948. It is difficult to 
make a generalization as to the optimum size of a dairy farm 
because of various topographical conditions and already existin~ 
industries interspersed between dairy farms. The extent to which 
dairy farms can be CG.mbined is limited by topographical conditions 
but this has beeD overcome oonsidera'hly by the mechaniz:ation of' 
dairy farms. The interspersion of various businesses between 
d.airy f'arm.s presents a more real barrier to the combining of' 
dairy f'arm.s, which limits the amount of pasture land aDd feed-
growin~ land available. A.''·large number of' dairy cows could be 
kept on a single farm if it were profitable to feed entirely 
commercial feeds. This has not been done on a large scale as 
yet, however9 It is possible that the production of mi1k could 
be revolutionized by a canniag process now being developed, 
whereby milk i .s taken from the cow, is processed, ud goes into 
small cans without being exposed to the air. In this way the 
milk can be kept fresh for months without refrigeration. This 
process, if' perfected and accepted, would mean that the pro-
duction and processin~ of milk would take plaee on ~dairy ~· 
carryi~ on l.arge scale operations. nis would elim1Jl8.te the 
1. 
2 .• 
Boston :Milk Jfarket. Statistics~ August 1937-Decem'ber 1947, 
Market Administrator, Table 2 • 
Ibid., Table 18. 
6 
handlers and would make the pricing of milk an entirely different 
problem. Ru1in~ out such an innovation, it is doubtful if mi~ 
can be produced on a large scale. The number of dairy farms 
is not likely to decrease to the point where the :production of 
milk will take place under oli~opolistic conditions. 
Empirical data have shown that there have been advantages 
of lar~e scale operations in the handling of milk, and that 
there has been a tendency toward the concentration of the 
handling of milk. Two large companies in the New York market 
are responsible for the delivery of two-thirds of the milk to 
homes or about o.ne-half of the milk sold in that market.l In 
the Boston marketing area 19 handlers receive 90 per cent of the 
milk comi~ into the market from the milkshed. 2 Although the 
amount of collusion or price leadership that tll_kes place in the 
handling of milk is not definitely known, there is sufficient 
reason to believe that it does not show the characrleristics of 
perfect competition, even in the absence of government control. 
Milk is a perishable commodity. It must be marketed 
immediately if the producer is not to suffer a complete loss. 
producers are generally in no position to transform their milk 
into manu~actured milk products which are storable. Conse-
quently, if producers are unorganized they are in an extremely 
weak positiQn and are forced to accept the prices offered by 
1. 
2. 
Reptrt of the New York Milkshed .Price Committee, transmitted 
to ne Marketing Administrator, FebrUary 1949, p. 40. 
Adam, Thurston M., What Makes the Price of Milk, Col1ege 
of Agriculture, University or Vermont, Brietiet No. 815, p. 3. 
7 
the handlers in the short-run at least. ~e producer's only 
derense in the absence or government control is to organize 
in a strong cooperative which can secure better terms for him. 
At!J is shown later in this chapter, eooperatives have been respon-
sible ror serious disturbances in the proper rlow of milk to the 
marketing areas and as a consequence this is no real remedy to 
the problem. 
The transportat.ion costs of milk are very high beeaue of 
its bulkiness and its perishability. This puts a real limit on 
the geographical area which will supply fluid milk to a parti-
cular market. For example~ Middle West dairymen can produce 
milk at a much lower cost than can dairymen in New England but 
the rormer cannot compete with the latter in the New England 
markets beoaus~ the differences in costs of producing milk 
would more than be absorbed by the difterenoes in costs or 
transportinn in shipping fluid milk to the New En~land markets. 
Another limiting factor to the si_;e of the milkshed is the 
sanitation regulations or ·certain markets. '!'he implications 
of these two ractors is discussed later on in this chapter. 
Pricin~ of milk to the producer is a difficult problem 
which has not been adequately solved. This is due to several 
reasons: (1) the elasticity of the demand for fluid milk differs 
widely from that or manufactured milk products; (2) there are 
pronounqed seasonal fluctuatio~ in the production or milk but 
very little in the consumption of fluid milkJ ! (3) day~to-day 
variations in the consumption of l":lilid Jli•:tk:-.ar8:"lllarJbe:d"G'Wllereas 
there is little variation in the day-to day production of milk; 
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poses may be elastic because of' substitutes that may be used. 
Also the demand for milk purchased at retail stores is likely 
to be more elastic. The nature of the elasticity of the demand 
for manufactured milk products has not as yet been satisfactorily 
determine4. The same difficulties in determining the elasticity 
of the demand for fluid milk are present and in addition there 
is the fact that manufactured milk products includes a much 
wider variety of commodities than the classification of fluid 
milk and consequently makes any estimate an insurmountable 
problem. However, it is generally agreed upon from empirical 
studies that the demand for fluid milk is much more inelastic 
than the demand for manufactured ~ilk products. 
Another factor which differentiates flui.d milk from mam.u.-
f'actured milk products is that the former is supplied from a 
milkshed which is limited in size by the high transportation 
costs which are due to the bulkiness of milk; the perishability 
of' milk and the strict sanitation laws of certain markets. 
Manufactured milk products go into much wider markets. They 
can be stored, are shipped at a cheaper cost and are not sub-
ject to as strict sanitation laws as are found for fluid milk. 
As a result, a greater degree of competition exists in the 
marketing of manufactured milk products than in fluid milk:. 
The handlers of milk are consequently faced with a manufactured 
milk products demand curve which is more horizontal than tlle 
demand curve for fluid milk. It is true that monopolistic 
competition exists in the marketing of both but what is important 
is that the degree of monopolistic competition differs. 
.~ ·; 
11 
These twa faetors, differences in tke elasticities af 
demand for the twa princiJ:)al outlets of milk and tke differenees 
in marketimg eanditions makes :peS$ible diserimi:native marketing 
which introduces another problem. This practice of discrimi-
native marketing has been described by J"o1m M:. Cassels. He 
summarizes the praetiee as follows: 
••••• tke practice of discriminative marketing as 
applied to milk involves, first, tke fixing of .. 
a price for that part. of the supply that is sold 
by tke dealers as fluid milk at a level whick is , 
higher relative to eream amd butter prices than 
would be established under freely competitive 
conditions, and secondly, the aceeptanee of a 
price for the balance of the supply wkieh is at 
the more normal oempetitive level with respect 
to these other types of dairy products. These 
priees are1referred to as the Class I al\ld Class II prices. 
~~is praetioe is quite similar to that of dumping ia in-
ternatianal trade. It caR be pictured graphically as Cassels 
laas d.one. Several assumptions are made and it is admittedly 
a crucie method or de]?iet,img what takes J?laee in discriminative 
marketin.g. Nevertheless, it gives a general theoretical ex-
planation which makes the coneept clearer. Aa a consequence 
it is re:pneduced here;·-
])1iagram 1 
Hypothetical Demand Curves :ror ~ilk in Class I 
,and Clas~ Markets 
I. Ibid., p. 51 
2. Ibid. 
A ~ 
B a'---- :S:_ 
E ~· ~ d 
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by the cooperative and the handler in. advance and at the end of 
the month a composite price to the producer was computed. Tne 
computed price, then depended upon the percentage of utilization 
of each class of milk. Cassels points out serious objections 
to this type of classified price plan.1 He states, • •••• they 
offer to non-participating producers and dealers particularly 
tempting opportunities for profitable price cutting; and se-
condly, they generally leave ~he participating dealer such 
opportunity to profit by dishonest accounting that the :tarmers 
invariably become convinced, rightly or wrongly, whenever times 
are bad that they are being cheated on the classification 
statements." 2 Non~participating handlers were able to buy 
milk from non-participatin~ producers at prices slightly above 
the blended prices of participating handlers whenever they 
were assured they could dispose of this milk in fluid. form •. 
consequently, they were able to undersell the participating 
handlers who had to pay a premium for milk going into :tluid 
uses. Atlother problem that existed was that there were differences 
in utilization of milk by the various participating handlers. 
As a consequence different blended prices were paid by the 
various handlers which tended to bring about continuous dis-
equilibrium. A::.method of remedying this was by means of a 
market wide pool to which all participating handlers and pro-
ducers of certain markets be loDged. Ul!der such a system all 
handlers paid the same blended price to the producers but by 
1. Cassels, op. cit •• . pp. 60-1. 
2. Ibid. 
15 
.. 
~ying into the pool ~ or drawing tram the pool fund each 
handler paid ~or the milk according to the uses to which it 
was put.1 Suoh a plan was put into e·ffect. in the New York City 
market through the efforts. o~ the Dairymen's League Co-operative 
Association, but it did not include all producers and handlers.2 
It was not until there were state and federal controls over the 
milk industry that all producers and handlers were subject 
to the pooling agreements. 
Fraa the above it can be concluded that the government must 
step in to control milk prices. In the first place, the milk 
industry d.oes not lend itself to competitive priciM• A system 
must be devised whereby all handlers pay for Ddlk in accordance 
with the uses to which it is put and the producers are paid 
a uniform price for milk of equal butterfat contents (transpor-
tation costs being the only difference). I:t is desirable to 
have less seasonal fluctuation in production which can be . eli-
minated somewhat by adjustments in prices. To carry out a plan 
of this nature requires a central organization with powers to 
make it compulsory that all parties concerned be subject to the 
regulations of the plan. 
There is in addition a strong moral reason for government 
intervention in the milk industry. It cannot be said that any 
commodity or service is absolutely indispensable to life, but 
certain commodities and services haTe been considered by our 
society as such. We feel that children and invalids should 
1. 
2. 
Mono~aph No. 32, op. cit.i p. 59 • . 
Repor of the New York Mil shed Price Committee, op. cit., p. 7. 
lo 
BGt be deprived 0f milk because we have considered it alm.est 
as ~ essential to their laealth.. Milk te ma::ay adults is co:m.-
side·red indispensable because of its high food value. nus 
there is sufficient reasoR te assure the general public tkat tlilere 
be a eo:m.tinuous flow of milk to the markets without i::aterrnntiol 
. .~ II 
by strikes and maladjastments in the market, a:md at a price wki.eh 
is net unreasonable. 
Wi.tl!t the exce:Qtion c:rf governmemt :fixing o:f milk prices 
to producers and consumers under the Hoover Regio::aal Milk 
CommissiCi>D. during Werld War I, t.laere Jaad been n.a governme:m.t 
regulatian of milk prices rmtil the 1930's. Prier to the .1930's 
government regulatio:m. of the milk industry was in the form or 
sanitation regulations. These regulations were generally aa-
ministered by municipal and state governments. I '(i 
The need for government regulation of price and supp~y 
' ' in the milk i:m.dustry was str01agly felt with the eomi:ag of the 
~reat Depression.. Tlae dairy industry was not as Jiard hit·. after 
world war I as were ether branches of agr~eulture. There had 
net bee::a the overexpansioA in the dairy in~ustry that had take• 
pla.:ee in tlae raising of sueh crops as w:tleat and eetto:m. during 
world War I. However, by th.e 1930's most ef' tlaese advantages 
aad eeen wiped out. There had beem a great decrease i::a the de-
mand for milk due te the industrial depression. Many farmers 
had sl:lifted into dairying rrom other branc~es ~r farming aad hai 
eaused a great increase iB t.Jn.e supply or milk. In 192.9 tJaere 
were 22,330,000 milk eews in tlae U:m.ited States but at tl:le 
'IDeginni:m.g ef' 1933 tlaere were 25,00Q,000 milk cows~ 'flil.ese two 
17 
factors contributed heavily to the building up of surpluses. 
Cheese and butter storage increased and the prices ot manufac-
tured milk products dropped to exceedingly low levels,l This 
brought on the establis~nt of small iudependent distributors 
and producer-distributors who did not participate iB pooling 
agreements and were able to cut prices drastically. 2 As a con-
sequence cooperatives were no longer capable of maintaining the 
prices of their members. It was fouad that both cooperatives 
and participating handlers were making pleas for government 
action. 
~he State of California pioneered in the trend of ~overn­
mental regulation of prices in the milk industry. In January of 
1932 the producers and distributors in the San Francisco market 
asked the director of Agriculture iD California to assist them 
in the stabilizatiom of resale prices in their market, 3 As a 
result, a milk trade board made up of producer and distributor 
representatives was established which drew up uniform purchasing 
and resale price schedules and maintained them. The Wisconsin 
Department of ~!culture issued an ord.er in November 1932 in 
which producers and haBdlers were permitted to draw up marketing 
plans and milk prices for the Milwawkee market,4 If' producers 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
APReport of the A!iicultural Adjustment Ac.t, May 1933 to 
:rebruary 1934, u. ~. Department of A~iou!ture, A~icu!ture 
Adjustment Xdlninistration, Washington D. c.: Government 
Printing Office, 1934, pp. 154-5. 
Mortenson, w. P., Milk Distribution as a Public Utiilitz, 
Chicago: 'Fhe University ot chica~ hess, 194o, p. 5. 
:Monograph No. 32, op. cit., pp. 59-oO. Ihia., p. so. 
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and dealers lla.ndling 90% of' t·he milk im this market agreed u:poE. 
the plans, then the plans weuld became bi:ndiE.g en all produeers 
and d.istri'but0rs in tlile marketi:mg area. By April 10, 1933 tke 
state e'f New Yerk J!J:ad passed and approved tke 'first specif'ic le-
gislatiG:n gever:ni:ng tke :priee of' milk. Other states 'followed 
ilil this li:m.e and by 1941, 21 states had ]lassed al!lCil a<iiapted le-
gislatiol!l similar to that: of' the state ef' New York. 1 
Federal action did not eome until the passa~ and ap:praval 
of' tke Agriculture Adjustment Aet in May of' 1933. Ulitder tJds 
1 Aat the secretary of' Agriculture was give::m. th.e power to enter 
into marketim.g agreements with d.istributors, handlers and 
proaueers of' certai::m. agricultural products alild to issue lieelil.se~ 
l.'p&I:-mitti:mg them to ~arket them t& market these :products moving 
in iE.terstate amd f'oreiglil eemmeree. ':Ii'lae priaeipal. objective of 
t:m.e .Agricultural Adjustment Ac:t. was tG raise tb.e price recei vEul ,[ . 
by tke producers. 
Immediately after tlae passage C/)f the Aet the S.ecr·etary ef' 
.Agrie:ul.ture was swamped with agreeme.n:ts between. milk pradueers-
and hamilers 'from all :parts of tlae United States. By the end 
ef 1935 he had issued 15 l.iee:mses.to dif'f'eren.t milk marketing 
areas. 
~e pri:mcipal points 'found in most 'federal. milk mar~eting 
.. ::.". 
agreeme.m.ts at tkis time were: tlae following: 
1. 
1. Definition of the contracting :parties to 
tke agreement. --.- , "' 
2. Defi:mitia:n. G>f' the boundaries. of thle :pro-
duction areas and the sales area in the 
aetecl rmder legislatioE. wlilieh was not· s:pecif'ieally &.esigned 
Tie ealif'orn.ia and Wisconsi:m: Agriculture Departments had I 
=========F=====E-IGP ~ke~egnLa~JL~n-Qf m~l~a~~~jl~--=======================~========== 
territory covered by the agreement. 
3. Statement in legal terms of the exact 
relationship between the contracting 
parties to the a~eement and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, under the terms of 
the Agriculture Ad.justment Act. 
4. statement of the proposed schedule of 
price minim~ payable to producers for 
milk delivered at the plants of the dis-
tributors, together with a definite state-
ment of the standards for milk om the mar-
ket with reference to butterfat and health 
regulations. 
5. A market plan providing in some instances 
for stabilizing of production and allot-
ment of nbases" and the handling of the 
classified sales by the distributors. 
6. A statement of the distributor's resale 
prices to be charged consumers of milk 
sold by them at wholesale or retail.l 
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The Boston milk marketing area was issued License No. 15 
and Agreement No. 21 was approved by the Secretary of Agriculture 
on November 3, 1933. As a result of the agreement and the li-
cense, prices received by producers and distributors were raised. 
In the interval preceding the issuance of the license, the dealer's 
sale price per quart was 10¢, the producer's share, f.o.b., was 
4.9¢ per quart, and the dealer's margin 5.1¢ per quart. After 
the license went into effect tlle dealer's sale price became 12¢ 
per quart, the producer's share, f.o.b., was -.5¢ per quart, 
and the dealer's margin was 5.5¢ per quart. 2 In the Boston 
Agreement the retail price of milk was set at a maximum and a 
minimum witb a range of 1¢. 
1. 
2. 
It was found virtually impossible to enforce the retail 
Agricultural Adjustments, United States Department of 
A~icurture, A~lcu!ture Adjustment Administration, 
Washington D. c.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1934, p. 57. 
Monogra;gh No. 32, op. cit., p. ~8. 
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.. 
:priee provision of the agreement. For the :nation as a whole 
there had bee:n 111 violations of the resale price schedules 
in the various marketi:ag areas by 0ctG>ber 5, 1935. By February 
1, 1934 the Secretary of Ag.rieu:lture, formd it necessary to 
eaneel all agreements. Baston retained its license but it 
Jmaa no machinery to carry on its license. 1 O:m. March 15, 1934 1 
the Bostom. milk marketing area was issued License No. 38. 'fhis I[ 
,. 1 1m II 2 l.icense differed from License Nio • .u, _:n tlaree _ ~ortant respeet!fj. 
I 
In the first place, the resale :provision in License No. 38 I 
was not includl..ei. 'The marketililg area under License N0. 38 was 
ae:fined as a much smaller area than tha~ defined under License 1 
No. 15. I 'fhe milksla.ed un.der License No. 38 included all approved! 
. II 
producers who shipped milk to the milk marketililg area w~ereas 
License No. 15 d.efi:m.ed a geogra:pkica:l area. License No. 38 
remained in effect rmtil February 9, 1935,, but was amendea·. 
nine differe:nt times. Many problems ana dissatisfaet.ions qn 
the part of produeers and ~andlers arose. 3 One of the diffi-
culties was technical definitions which had to be revised fran 
time to time. Eeamomie :problems which had not been foreseen 
also made it necessary to ame:nd th~ lieense. DissatisfaettE>l'lS 
an the part of producers and handlers were responsible for-many 
of the ela.anges. Bargaining for price changes t0 be written ill 
the license took o~ considerable impqrtance. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
,, ·,' 
Barnhart, G. R., Federal Re@lation of Milk Handling in 
Boston, 1933-1945, Thesis, Ira:rvard university; ApriL 194"7, 
p. 165. 
Ibid.' p. 82. 
! detailed aeeormt o:f Liee:nses 15 and 38 a:rad Federal Order 
I 
I 
Ne. 4 ale:mg with· tlile man.y ameJildments is faun~. 13.. Federal 
========~====R~ga~~~4on=o~=M~~k=Hand~~~ng==~n=Be&toar=l9$3~9~o~ ~Q~"~~-·~~<~~-~~~~~·t========= 
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On February 9, 1936 Licen~e No. 38 was cancelled and the 
Boston marketing area became ujder Federal Order No. 4, which 
has remained in effect with ~everal amendm.e·nts up to the pre-
sent time. The basis for this new order was an amendment to the 
Agricultural Adjustment AOt approved on Angust 24, 1935 which 
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing 
agreements w1 th milk produc·ers and handlers and to issue orders 
in conjunotiom with these agreements. Yhis provision gave the 
secretary of' Agriculture broader powers and the orders issued 
became binding upon more producers and distributors than there 
had been under the system of' licenses. 
Soon after Federal order No. 4 went into effect the Secre-
tary of Agriculture sought to enjoin the David Buttrick Company 
trom violating the order but the Federal District Court for 
Massachusetts dismissed the 'bill in equity because the Agricul-
tural Adjustment AC.t had been declared unconstitutional by the 
united states Supreme Court and consequently it stated that it 
had no jurisdiction over this matter. As a result of this Fe-
deral Order No. 4 was suspended. On June 16, 193'1 the Circuit 
oourt of' Appeals reversed the deeision of the Federal District 
court of' Massachusett~. 'l'he Marketing Agreement Act, which 
more clearly defined the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture . 
in the issuance or orders, was passed and approved at about the 
same time. Federal Order No. 4 was reinstated in Boston but it 
was not until the United States Supreme Court decision in 1939 
in the H. P. Hood & sons v. u.s. case that the constitutionality 
of the Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 was establisliled and that 
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Federal Order No. 4 could be enforced without tear of adverse 
court decisions. 
'PWo methods have been used in establishing Class I prices 
in the Boston. Licenses 15 and 38 and Federal Order No. 4. One 
method was that of writin~ a minimum price in the license or or-
der. The price written in the agreement remained in ett'ect until 
it was changed by means or another hearing whereby it became an 
amendment. This pract.ioe was followed until October 25, 1941. 
Needless to say this was a slow and expensive way of establishiD~ 
Class I prices. Furthermore, the price specified in the license 
or order was the result or the relative bargaining strength or 
the parties concerened in establishing prices. 
on October 25, 1941 an amendment to Federal Order No. 4 
made a provision for formula pricing of Class I milk. This was 
a very crude formula which was based on the price of butter. 
If the average of daily quotations of prices of 92-score butter 
at wholesale in the New York market as reported by the United 
states Department of Agriculture for the 30 days immediately 
preceding the 25th day of each month was under 40¢ per pound, 
the price of Class I milk would be $3.63 per hundredweight and 
if the price of butter was over 40¢ the price of milk would be 
$3.8&. Beginning January 16, 1939 Glass I prices were fixed 
at dir~erent levels for the short and flush seasons of productioa 
through the hearing process. In the amendment of October - ~, 
1941 there was a specific provision for seasonal pricing but 
this provision was abandonned April 3, 1942. 
OB March 15, 1943 a formula similar to the preceding one 
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was drawn up. This stated that if the butter price was under 
40¢ the Class I price would be $3.64; if the butter price were 
40¢ but under 45¢ the Class I price would be $3.87; and if the 
butter price were 45¢ or over the Class I price would be $4.10. 
The butter price was fixed at 46.75¢ per pound by o. P. A. and 
consequently the Class I price remained at $4.10 fran March lS, 
1943 through May 31, 1946 •. 
AAnew formula was adoptedin an amendment which became e~­
fective June 1, 1946. This formula known as the "butter-powder" 
formula tied prices to the New York butter value and the avera-
ges of the Talues of hot roller process sk~ powder for human 
consumptioll and animal :teed. Under this formula, if the butter 
and powder value varied upward or downward sufficiently. to .move 
between brackets having five-cent intervals the price of Class I 
milk varied in the same direction by 20-oent intervals per hun-
dredweight. Also there was a provision in this formula for a 
25-cent increase in price for the months of July through March 
over the months of April through June. 
This formula proved to be highly unsuceessful from the 
very beginning. It was suspended several times by the sec~e­
tary of A~iculture in order to establish desirable Olass .I 
prices. In 1947, t'ive of the price -changes were due to the 
-
suspension or the 'formula. The <ii'fficulties encountered in 
the use of this formula were that butter and powder prices were 
erratic and served as a poor measure of general economic condi-
tions. The instability of butter prices were due to, . ft ••••• the 
advanced psychological appraisal of demand and supply prospects 
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for butter by the forces that make the central wholesale butter 
market."'1 Powder prices had ha4 a Ciownward trend because of the 
uncertainty of what the post-war markets would be in relation to 
the greatly expamded supply which took place during the War. 
By the latter part of 1946 and early 1947, it became quite 
apparent that a new formula or a new method to price <nass I 
milk would have to be found to replace the ftbutter-powdertt for-
mula. There was much pressure exerted on the part of both pro-
ducers and handlers that some kind of change come about. This 
prompted Mr. Richard D. Apli:n. then the Acting Marketing Admi-
nistrator to appoint on April 23. 1947 a group of New England 
EConomists to, " ••••• Dl8.ke an · intensive study of the problem of 
how best to establish Class I prices in the Boston market in 
1948 and in 8uccee41~ yeara."'2 
The preceding discussion has shown how Class I prices have 
been determined under Federal Order No. 4. It has been shown 
that changes have been made from time to time because of changing 
economic conditions. Changes were also made as a better under-
standing of effectuating controls was attained. Federal control 
over milk markets is still ill the experime:atal stage and will 
undoubtedly continue to be so for some time. Any permanency at 
all in Federal orders cannot be expected as long as economic con-
ditions change and there is not a thorough understanding of the 
responses of producers, distributors and consumers to Federal 
regulation of milk prices. 
1. A Reoomm.ended Basis of Pricing Class I Milk in the Boston 
Market, A-' report of the Boston Milkshed Price committee, 
september, 1947, p. 4. 
2. Ibid.~ p. i. 
Chapter II 
THE CURRENT METHOD OF PRICING CLASS I MILK 
IN THE BOSTON MILKSHED 
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'!'he Bosto:n. Milkshed Price Committee, which was appointed by 
Mr. Richard D. A~lin to study the problem of how best to esta-
blish Class I prices in the Boston Market, consisted of members 
representin~ producers, handlers, and the government. 1 There 
was no representative of any consumer organization as such. It 
was argued at the Hearings held October 20 to October 23 1947 
on the adoption of the formula that this was compensated by the 
presence of disiBterested members on the Committee, namely Dr. 
Black and Dr. AdBJ118. Dr. Black argued quite strongly at the 
Hearings that he was well qualified to represent the consumer 
interests. Two of the members, Mr. Welden and Mr. Bronson re-
presented the handlers; Dr. SWonger and Mr. Smith represented 
producers; and Dr. Dow and Mr. Lee were both employed by the 
government. 
It is difficult to determine precisely how much consideration 
1. The Committee consisted of Dr. Thurston M. Adams, Head of 
the Department of Agricultural Economics at u.v .M.; Dr. John 
Black, Henry Lee Professor at Harvard University; Mr. Wesley 
H. Bronson, Vice-President of the Whiting Milk oo., Dr. George 
F. Dow, Economist and Assistant Director of the Maine Agri-
cultural Experiment Stwtion; Mr. James D. Lee, Economist 
at the Boston Federal Milk Marketing Administrator's Office; 
Mr. Chester w. Smith, Director of Cooperative Dairy Econo-
mics service; ]Jr. c. w. SWonger, Research Economist of the 
New England Milk Producers' Association; and Mr. William 
c. Welden, Economist of H. P. Hood and Sons, Inc. 
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nection with the discussion of the Hearings on the adoption of 
the formula. The lack of eo3sumer consideration is clearly seen 
at that time whereas it cannot be stated definitely that the Com-
mittee did not adequately consider the consumer when it drew up 
the formula. 
By September of 194~ the Boston Milkshed Price Committee 
had completed its investigation as requested by the Federal Milk 
Market Administrator and had submitted its findings in a detailed 
report entitled, A Recommended Basis of Pricing Class I Milk in 
the BostoBMarkWt. This report and a condensed version of it 
were made available to the public. 
After the findings of the Committee had been reported about 
twenty producer and handler organizations requested by means o~ 
a petition to the Secretary of Agriculture that Hearings be held 
on the amendment of Federal Order No. 4 in line with the recom-
mendations of the Committee. 
The request was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and 
the notice of the Hearings was published in the Federal Register 
on October 14, 1947. The Hearings were to be held in three dif-
ferent places: Skowhegan, Maine on October 20, 1947; St. Johns-
bury, Vermont on October 21; and Boston, M.ass. on October 22 and 
23. The short time between the date of the announeement .of the 
Hearings and the dates that the Hearings were held is of parti-
cular interest. Opponents of the formula were quite justified 
in complaining that they had not had sufficient time to prepare 
adequate testimony to present at the Bearings. Another complaint 
that the co'Pp.olients~ of the formula had was that the renorts of 
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3, 1947. Opponents of the formula also caaplained of this. They 
felt that it was not adequate time to make a thorough study of 
the effec.ts of the formula and to prepare a brief on it. Mr. 
James c. Gahan, an attorney, representing the Massachusetts Res-
taurant Association made the following comment in his one page 
brief: "Arguments and quotations from said transcript in sup-
port of the position of the Association are not submitted here-
in because of the arbitrary manner in which the Hearing Master 
refUsed to permit Couns.el for the Association sufficient tiJle 
to examine the transcript and prepare an adequate brief.ft This 
.JI W •• 
is pointed out to show that consumer consideration in this res-
pect is much in line with the comment of the T.N.E.c. quoted on 
page 26. 
The testimony a~ tbe Hearings and the briefs were reviewed 
by the Dairy Branch of the Department of Agriculture and a report 
on its findings was released on February 27, 1948. Proponents 
of the formula had hoped that the report would come out sooner · 
and that the formula be adopted by January 1, 1948. The March 
1948 issue of the New England Uairyman pointed out the following: 
With so many and such reputable New England org-
anizations and individuals urging prompt action, 
it would seem that the Department of Agriculture 
couldn't fail to act. But that action was slowed 
down by the efforts of Hew York dealers who had 
bucked this new formula trom its inception and 
who fought its adoption to the. last ditch. And 
brushing aside the camouflage of reasons they 
presented for delaying the adoption of the for-
mula until July 1, one can find only ome plau-
sible explanation of their action. It must have 
been for the purpose of assuring cheap milk at 
the producers• expense during the spring and 
summer. 
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By March 25tk the Secretary o~ Agriculture had signea the 
amendment to the O>rder making it possible te use the mew ~or­
mula in the pricing o~ milk for April 1948. 'flile formula whick 
·was finally adopted was substantially the same as tlil.at :pr0p0sed 
by tke Boston Milkshed Prije Committee. ~he minor changes. that 
were proposea and ~ceepted by producers and handlers are dis-
cussed later on i:m. this chapter. 
Before describing the mechanics o~ the present Clas.s I milk 
price :rormula, the objectives o~ tlae Co>Inm.ittee a:ad its reasens 
'for selecti:ng tln.e :rormula method o'f pricing milk are presented. 
These are re~erred to in many instances in conneotio~ with the 
discussiG>a of the theoretical aspects and the actual effects of 
the 'formula. T~e four foll@Wi:m.g principal objectives were out-
lined by the Committee: 
1. The delivery e:r suf'fieient milk from pro-
ducers to provide a reserve above Class I 
milk sales t:>f between 15 and 20 per cen.t of 
receipts in the months of lowest production, 
assuming a reasonable pattern of receipts. 
2. Ar·.less kigh.ly seasonal pattern o:r production 
than that o~ recent years •. 
!3. Market stability aeco:mplished tln.rough orderly 
and timely adjustment in prices for changing 
supply and G.em8.l!l.<l conditions .• 
4. Maintenance ef producer priees and incomes 
at a satis~ac~.ory leyel relative to general 
economic con<l~tiens. . 
It is to be note~ that nothing in the objectives is said 
about a fair price tG tlae consumer. However, the C0IDin.i.ttee diGl 
reeegnize that consideration should be given ta the consumer. 
This is seen in tlae fGllowing statement made by the Co.mm.ittee 
1~ Bosto:n Milksked Price Committee, op. 8it.L p. 2. 
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the producer that will e~fect consumption decisions. This again 
is not a criticism directed at the Committee but is one direct.ed 
at the Marketin~ Agreement Aot. 
The Boston Milkshed Price Committee considered the adTantages 
and disadvantages of pricing Class I milk by means of any kind 
of formula. It listed the ~ollowing advantages and disadvantages: 
Advanta~es 
1. Greater assurance is given to producers, dealers 
and the public that prices will be adjusted 
promptly, botm upward and downward, when con-
dition warrant adjustment. 
2. Producers are assured in advance that the milk 
price will be in line with production costs and 
with general economic conditions. 
~. A guarantee of adequate seasonal price differentia~s 
is provided. 
4. The number of hearings can be reduced and the 
time-pressure which develops wit·h all price 
hearings is much less. 
5. A procedure is provided for reducing the price 
without requiring producers to vote direot.ly for 
a reduction. 
Disadvantagee 
1. It is very dif~icult to re:rlect short-term local 
economic conditions in a formula, including 
particularly conditions growing out of variable 
weather. 
2. 'Fhe formula does not give producers an advance 
guarantee of specific prices; rather it only 
assures them of prices that will be in line with 
the formula pricing relationships. 
3. It is very difficult to enable producers to under-
stand the formula, and consequently it is dif-
ficult to obtain good evidence from producers 
at hearings to consider the adoption or amend-
ment of formulas. 
4. Formulas have shown themselves to be rather 
easily adaptable to the suspension procedure; 
thus scheduled price changes may be1prevented rather easily merely by suspension. 
1. Easton Milkshed Price Committee, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
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The Committee ~elt that the advantages strongly outweighed 
the disadvantages and concluded that formula pricing should be 
the method employed. A comparison of the above advantages and 
disadvantages leads one to believe that the Committee was com-
pletely justified in making its recommendation. 
The foregoing discussion has been concerned with the pre-
paration that went into the development and adoption of the for-
mula as an amendment to Federal Order No. 4. A description of 
the mechanics of the formula and other provisions in the Federal 
Order closely related to the Class I formula is presented in the 
remainder of the chapter. 
The present formula for pricing Class I milk can be des-
cribed under four headin~s: (1) the formula index; (2) the sea-
sonal adjustment provision; (3) the supply-demand adjustment 
provision; and (4) the contraseasonal provision. 
The formula index is made up of three components which mea-
sure general and local economic condi tiona. One of these,, the 
united States monthly Wholesale Commodity Price Index as reported 
by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics is used to re-
present ~neral economic conditions. The monthly Index of De-
partment Store Sales in the Boston Federal Reserve District as 
reported by the Federal Reserve System and a Grain-Labor Index 
as computed by the Federal Milk Marketing Administrator's Office 
of Boston are used as measures of local economic conditions. 
These three indices are converted to a 1925-29 base period 
and are given equal weight,s in the computation of an average to 
arrive at the formula index. The latest available indices are 
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used te compute the formula index whick is announeea o~ the 
25ta of eaeh month and· is used as one of the determimants ef 
the price of Class I milk in the following month. 
The U:nited States Wholesale Commodity Price In<llie:x:. is re-
ported on a 1926 base period by the u.s .. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics and is converted to a 1925-29 base by dividi~g each 
m0nthly reported index number by 0.98. There is actually a 
two-moE..t1il lag i1il the use e>f the United Stat.es Wholesale Commodi .. y II 
price Index. For example, the March index is reported in April! 
amd is used to determine the price of milk in May. 
The second component of the formula index {the monthly in-
dex of Department store Sales in the Boston Federal Reserve Dis~ 
• il 
trict) is treated slightly different. Tkis index 1s en a l935-r9 
base period and is converted to the 1925-29 base period by di- \1 
viding by 1.26. The three latest montJas are avera~d rather II 
than using a single month.as in the United States Wholesale ComL 
li 
modity :Price Index. Co:m.sequently there is a greater lag. ·For I! 
example, the i:m.diees of January, February and March are used t0l\ 
price ,.:1:r::n:::a::>l~:d:: ::Y :.de up of two componeRts. M 
1
1 
simple averf!ge of the four latest weekly average retail prices 
per ten of dairy ration in the Bosto:m. Milkshed as reported by 1) 
the United Sta:tes Department sf Agriculture is take:m a:md is ce:n~ 
verted t.o a.lil i:m.dex on a 1925-29 base period by dividing by 0.50rll • 
The grain. c0mponent aas the least lag. 'l''o :price milk in April 
of 1950, the prices ef dairy ration in the weeks of February 25\, 
I 
March 4, M:areJa 11, and Marcla 18 were takel!l, whioh breuglat about. 
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factors represent local economic conditio:ns and one factor re-
presents general economie conditions. 
Table 1 0:n :page 38 is the Glass I price schedule as fou:m.d 
i::n Federal Order No. 4. 'llais schedule is a series of formula 
iE.dex brackets with o<:>rres]Hl>JildiRg prices for Class I milk in 
the 201-210 mile zen.e i:m. tlae four quarters of the year. ']'Jn.e 
prices in the seeend c0lumm (dan.~Feb.-Mar.; July-Aug.-Sept.) 
are use~ here to explain the formula index phase of the Class 
I price so:taedule. '11\l.e tlilree eelumns of :prices deal with. seas- Jl 
senal price differences. and are explai:nea later en im tlrls chap-( 
ter. It is firs-t. 0f all necessary tG explai:n the base :peried I 
i 
price whic:& was f'oUll.d by t.aking the average price of 100 :pem.1ds! 
I 
of milk iE. the 201~~no mile zellle of tke Best11>n Milkshe<i from 1.925, 
to 1929. This average price was found te be $3.19. ~heoretiea~y, 
II tl.!l.en, if the fermula imdex were 100 t:m.e price of' Glass I milk J1 
lr 
i:n the 2;0l-21.0 mile z.el!e would be $3.19 .. 
Tlae price schedu.le is se devised that the prices are il!l 
22-cent intervals. It is of interest to shQW kew tlaese price 
intervals with the correspon.ding index ra::m.ges were determined. 
Th.e first price seeR in t:m.e schedule is $1.69 and is tlae price 
that would be paid if' tlae f'ormula iE.dex were between 50 and 5€), 
and. colilsequently is act.ually tlae price tlaat corres:p0mds te the 
oe:m.ter 0f' the bra.oket. 'TQ aet.ermiJte tlllis bracket., prices ef' 
$l .. 59 an.d $l.80 which are 11 cents 0:m eaclll side of $1.69 were 
divided individually by $3.19 wkiok gav• iRdex Rumbers ef' 50 
and 56. The remaimder of the formula index braekets were f'0umd 
i:n th.is f'ashipn. 
-; 
II · .... 
1: 
I 
I 
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in May and June in contrast to the 51 to 61 percent that existed 
during World war II. They felt that this objective could be 
reached by having a blended price in November and December, 40 
per cent above that of May and June and that this 88-oent dif-
ferential would produce the difference needed. The 88-cent 
differential would bring about a 40 percent difference in the 
blended price with the aid of the differences in blended price 
brought about by a greater percentage of Class I milk in Nov-
ember and December than in May and June. Another point in con-
nection with this, is that the 88-cent dif~erence in the Class 
I price would produce a 40 per cent dif~erence in the blended 
prices, only at the approximate prices of the two classes of 
milk that existed at the time that the formula was dra~ed (1947). 
The drafters of the formula could not say at what points, below 
or above the then existing prices, it would be necessary to ill-
traduce a new price difference in order that the same blended 
price percentage differential might be maintained. With this 
admission, it can then be said that the Class I price schedule 
will not hold for all possible formula index numbers. 
The third element in the formula is the supply-demand ad-
justment provision. This was put into the formula as a safe-
guard. Fundamentally, It provides tor changes in the Class I 
milk price when the Class II milk utilization pereenta~el goes 
above or below a certain range. It is based on a 12-month ave-
1. Class II milk utilization percentage is the percentage of 
Class II milk relative to the total of all Class I and Class 
II milk in the pool. 
========~=r=a=g=e e~ Class II milk utilization ~ercemtages iaoluding tae4:er~~ --_ ~ --
ce:mtage of the latest mo:m.th available T\rior te tlae a:mRou:mcement tl J!' i I 
:i 
ef the Class I price. F'or example, im the announcement of the II 
class I price OE. April 25,- 1950 fer May 1950 tlile 12~montla perio~ 
endi:ng March 1950 was averagecl. I~ this average is below 33 II 
J>-ercen.t, the er4er prevides t:m.at tl1le Class I price be: increased j\ 
44¢ from that called by the formula index;- amd if the percemtag, 
is above 41, the Glass I price is decreased «¢. I 
l 
Tlae Cem:mittee' s deri vatieE. of tl1le limits of the Class II I 
milk utilization perce:mtages i•volved a ra~her c®m]>licated pre-
1 
eedure. Only a general idea ef that procedure is giveE. here. I 
~lie drafters Gf the formula f'elt that it Wl:i.S desirable to have 
I 
between 15 and 25 percent of' Class II milk i:m the montk of loweJt 
II produetion which is November. 'fhey felt that tln.e 15 percent lewer 
. . I 
limit was justified on the greunds that tlais was the miE.imum sJ[-
plus wit& which ka:ndlers o0uloi meet theh' O.ay-tG~!'Y variatiolllS II 
i:m tlile censumptio:m of fluid milk i:m the B0stem market. The ~5 ~~ 
I_J·ercent upper limit was selected mere or less arbitrarily but 
1
1 
I' the Cemmittee felt tlaat tJil.is would previae a reasenable range I 
witaim. wkich the Class II percentages could vary. Hewever, it I 
II 
was theu.gkt unwise to make a supply"""demani adjustme:m.t o:n the II 
easis of' a si:m.gle m0ntla. ']lhat is, if the Class II milk peree:ata:Jge 
I: 
were a®ove 25 or bel0w 15 in the month ef' November in a particul~r 
year, there would be no true indicatioE. that this was a trena li !I 
I 
and that an adjustme:m:t i:n pric·e was called f'er. .Am. average of' I 
several months, it was thought, would indicate a trem.d. I 
.A tw.el1i 
I 
~--=~·====~==========================================================~========= 
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month average was finally decided upon. The problem was then to 
to determine yearly averages of Class II percentages which would 
correspond to the 15 and 25 percent in November. This translatio·n 
was done by a rather complicated procedure which produced the 
33 and 41 percents. T'he 33 percent. yearly average corresponds 
to 15 percent in November and the 41 percent yearly average to 
the ~5 percent in November. 
The supply-demand adjustment factor could not be applied un-
til after December 1948 whereas the foril.ula went into effect 
April 1948. In addition to this there were two rest-rictions on 
its usage·, which are defined in Sec. 904.7(a), subparagraphs o, 
7, and a, of Federal Order No. 4. The first of these restrictions 
is that the 44-cent increase or decrease cannot be employed if' 
it raises or lowers the Class :r price in that particular month 
so that the price in that month would exceed or be less than the 
price of' the same month in the previous year by more than 88 cents. 
However, a portion of the 44-cent increase could be used to make 
the price difference just 88 cents over the price in the same 
month of the previous year. An example will make this clearer. 
The price of' milk, let us say, in June of' 1955 will be $3.01. 
13 This the price called for by the formula index and the Class II 
percentage is within the 33 and 41 percent limits. In June of 
1955, the formula index calls for a price ot $3.67 and the Class 
II percentage this time has gone below the 33 percent lower limit. 
A '·44-cent increase would normally be introduced at this point. 
However, if it were used the Class I price in June of' 1956 would 
be $4.11 and would exceed the J"une 1955 price by $1.10. Conse-

_jn===·-- ===== -- -~~==~=co. 
after December 1948. !'he New England Milk. Preduoers Assaeiati0:m. 
!I particularly oppmsed this change because there was a shortage O• 
I milk i:m. the Bosto:m. market according te the definition of the i 
supply-dema:m.d adjustment prevision, which would have meant a 
price 44¢ above the priee callea. for by the i:m.G.ex. However, I 
the Dairy Branek felt tnat tl!le effects of the formula index she1!lld 
II be give:m. ample time to work themselves Gut. It is shoWE. illl Clil.a:p-
d 
ter IV th.at the Dairy Bra:m.cl!l l!lad. made a wise decision iB. tkis 'I 
respect. 
II 
Other elaanges proposed by the Dairy Branch were tlae folle~ag: 
II (1) A three menth's average of the index mf departme:m.t store saies 
should be used instead 0f' the index of e:a.e month. as :praposed l:,.y/1 
I th.e Bosta:m. Milkshed Price Committee. (B) The Committee had sug-1 
gested usi:m.g the feed prices of the latest month whereas the I 
Dairy Branch proposed usi:m.g averages of feed prices ef the late~t 
four weeks avei;ilable. (3) A\15 percent safeguard had m:eeR prG>:pa~ea 
by the C0mm.i ttee. Tlil.is. stated that tllle 44-ceRt increase could 
1
1 
1 not be remoV'ed eve:m. thouglil the Class II percentage lilaa returE.ed 
I 
ii 
to a twelve-montb. average of 31 percent er higher until there II 
had been twelve molilths i:a whiela the Class II percentages l!iad E.o~ 
! 
beeR below 15 percent i:m. any month. The Dairy Eralileh proposed ! 
that th:l.s safeguard be eliminated. ( 4) The restriction Olll the I 
::p~::::::\;d~::t::~·:::::h:" pages 42-43 o~ tkis chapter ~~ 
For the exceptioi of these chauges, the formula ree0mmeE.de~ 
by the Bost.eE. Milkshed JPTice Committee was writte:n i11 Federal 
Order No. 4. The changes proposed by ~he Dairy Branch favored 
45 
the consumer to a certain extent. 
I 
T~is completes the discussion. of the mechanics of the Clas~ 
I milk price formula. Taroughout the discussioR, reference was 
~::~: :~:ld:~;::~t:::: ~:rt::.2:::::i:~:o:0::·th:p:::::J 
of' the zone prices. 'rh.e zone leeat",iolil. is def'ined by the cite 
of the plant the milk was shipped to by the producer an.d the I 
i 
railreaa freight mileage distance from the shipping point 0~ I 
' tkat plant to Boston. Once the zone price differentials have · 
been found, the determinatiem of the zone price is merely a I 
matter o'f adaing or subtractin.g t:rn.e appropriate zone differential 
I 
'from the Class I price in the 201-210 mile zone. I 
I 
Aa analysis of the Class I :price formula requires an umderf 
sta.ndiB.g ef the r~le played li>y the Class ll fermula. Consequen~ly 
: 
a brief deseriptiom of the Class II :e·ormula is given here. Ap- i 
pendix B is a sample of the eom.-putat.iolil. of Class II priee:s for II 
March 1950 a:m.d illustrates the procedure and the elements useG., I 
im the formula. 'Fhe -two variable factors that. determine the J 
ptr.'iee ef Class II milk are the weighted average price per 40-qu~rt 
can.o:r 40 percent bottling quality cream and the average price I 
per pound of roller process nonfat dry milk solids for human 
eonsum.ptierm:., iE. earlets, f .e.b., Clrlcago area manufaeturi:ag 
plants. Since the Class :II price is determined first. for the 
201-210 mile zone, $0.525 is subtracted which is the freight 
cost of slaip:pi.ng a oaE. of milk fr0m tlllat zone te Boston. The 
value of t1le cream is theE. divided by 33.l8 t<D determilile the 
value of a poUlild ef butterfat. im. er·eam. When this is multipli.ed 
l. The meaning of 3.7 milk is give~ later inthis chapter. 
.I 
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by 3.7, it gives the value of butterfat in 100 peunds 0f milk 
going into Class II usage. Tfhe price of a :pormd of the mi.lk :pcow.tler 
is multiplied by 7.5 whiclil. is th.e numbe·r of pc·tutas 0f s~ lnilk: 
p0wder that caR be made fDDm separating 40 percent cream from 
100 :pounds Gf !3.7 milk. From the tot:al of the value of the but-
terfat and the value of tlae skim milk is subtract.ed a charge tka;t 
covers the cost of receiving, handling ana processing Class !I 
milk, and for the administration assessment. This charge varies 
with the months of the year as follows: January-, February, Oc-
tober, November 8J!ld December ... 57.5¢; August ana Se]>tember - 63.5¢; 
m:arck, April, Augus:t antii September - 59.5¢; and May and dTune ·-
75.5¢. '1\!:b.te prices fsr tln.e remaining z0nes are determined by 
adding or suli>tracting the Class II price zoE.e differentials to 
the Class II price in tln.e 201-210 mile zone. (See Appendix A} 
'l\!:b.te individual producer in the Boston Milkshed is not paid 
tor the milk he ships aec0rding to the uses to which his milk 
is put li>ut is paid a blended price. This blended price is arriJed 
at through a procedure of pooling. Pooling agreements were desl 
cribed iR a general way in C:hapter :t, but. it will be helpful in I 
uaderstanding the operation of t:m.e Class I formula if a rather 
complete description of the methoa used.. in arriving at blen&ed 
:prices in the Beston market is giveR. The blended price is :ne-
ferred to frequen.tly tlarougb.out the remainder of the tlaesis. 
Tkere are f0ur ~actors whieh enter i~te the determinatiea 
G>f the blended price: (1) the Glass I :price, (2:) the Class II 
priee, (3) tBe Class I pereentage, and (4) the Class II percent~~·· 
47 
milk ill tlae :p00l, his location. in respec-t. t® tJae Great.er B0staD. 
marketi:mg area aE.d the amonnt of butterfat eojtained in l'il.is mil!. 
r== 
I 

Chapter Ill 
THEORETICAL ASPECTSi OF THE 
FORMULA 
4:9 
An analysis o~ tlil.e c0mpement parts o~ t~e ~0rmula and the 
~ormu.la as a whole is u:radertake.m in this chapter. 'file purpese 
ef this analysis is to determine the relationskips that exist 
between the formula and supply a:rad demand co:raditions. Before 
going into this analysis, it may be well t0 paint out an im:- 11 
1: 
portant inemasisteney in tlae ob>jeetives set forth. by the Bostonlj 
I, 
Milkshed Price Committee. 
II 
A refleet,ion om the feur pri:m.ciple objeetive:s leads e>ne te:J! 
believe that there is a reasonable possibility of imeonsisteneJI 
between the first three objectives as opposed to the fourth 
objeetive.1 ~ke first t.A.ree objectives deal wit'h purely eco:rao-
I 
mie matters. Iamely, t.A.ey are the attainment of a specific ra.m~e 
' II 
erf Class II milk percentages, a reauct,io:a in tla.e seaso:m.al patterl!l 
II 
of production, ana the realizat.io:a of market stability by means 1j 
I 
of timely. adjustments in prices. for changing S'\mi>ply and dema:aa I 
eonditio:m.s. The f0.urth objective on. the otker la.and has a pre- !1 
I! 
I dominantly ethical eenn0tation. It. states that producer prices 1
1 and i:ncomes slaould be maiE.tai:m.ed ""at a sat.isfactory level rela-
1 
tive te general eoo:raomic conditions". i I 
WheE. the milk industry is under government regulation.,· it 1l 
If is quite apparent that the laws of cempeti tion no longer operat., 
See p. 30. 
50 
1. Testimemy of Dr. JOhn D. Black at the Hearing on the Class 
I milk price formula held i~ B0sto~,. Mass. on October 2a, 
1947, p. 316. 
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tlite dairy industry - net even the firms with the laigh.est costs. I 
I In sucla a situation there w0uld exist an oversupply of milk. Itl 
is true tkat this exam~le is largely oversim~lified but it does i 
illustrate the basic ililconsistency between the objectives set \ 
forth by the Committee. 'l'lil.e argument is th.at a guarantee of in~ 
I comes according to an arbitrary level and the establishment of I 
a desired balance between supply and demand does not necessarilJ 
I 
follow. 'This criticism is not directed solely at the objectives! 
. I 
of the Committee: but is also directed at the present Federal Farm 
I 
I 
I 
Fr®gram.. 
It becomes a question of whetker we are ililterested in the 
proper allocation of our resources or whether we want to make· 
I 
it possible for dairy farmers to stay on their :farms, purely :fori 
sentimental reasons. It is held in this thesis that the ~ro~er 
1
1 
allocation of our resources is the more desirable objective. j 
:many o:f the argumeE.ts in this thesis, particularly in this chapt
1
er, 
1/ 
·:'-, 
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AB element o~ making many arbitrary decisions still exists. I 
A:m.other :problem, wkioh is cl0s~ly related to that or sam:pli[g 
is that e~ c:heosing ap_propriate w-'&ghts fer "t-he eompene:m.ts o.f tJ;:t~ 
iRdex. 'flae object 0f' weighting is, "'• ;: ••• to give eaeh commodit 
price the im])artance it should li!.ave in view a~ the :Ji>ll.llP<.?Se or 
the index. n·1 Weighting the:m. involves the :fi:rading of' a figure 
whieh truly represents the relative importance of a compo:m.ent ~ 
a:m index. Figures may be available that adequately ~present 
the proportionate importance of the various camponents or an 
index number, but arbitrary decisions are orten made i:m. the se-
lection o:f weights whick i:m.treduces the possibility o~ inaccural~ 
i~ index numbers. 
~he seleGtion o:f a proper ~ormula is alse of' considerable 
I 
importance. Irving Fisher in his bo<:>k, The Making of Index Num-l 
~ lists 134 possible formulas and demenstrates that very rew J 
_practical formulas are void o~ bias o~ some kind or other. He ,I 
construeteQ. a ~ormula whioln. ln.as reduced mueln. 0~ the possible bia!s, 
but this formula is so expensive te cempute and so time~eensumiJ~ 
tll~t it loas be":a s oareel.y used ill we&l. re et>gBizeil btdex ~Ulllbers .II 
'!'ke preblem o~ the selection of an appropriate formula rer an [i 
index is m0 simple matter.. Tln.ere is no detailed discussion o~ I 
I the preblem in this tln.esis because it is really a subject whick! 
ean very well be treated by itself. 
· r<· · The ~i.mal problem is t:tae seleotioE. e~ an apprepriate base 
11. Nei.swaE.ger, William A~,, Elementary Statistical Methods, New. i 
1 York: The MacMillan Company, 1949, p. 385. 
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period. Some statisticians feel that this may not be too im-
portant. A base period is merely a point of reference and the 
general criteria for its selection are: (1) a period which is 
generally considered normal, (2) theperiod must not be too dis-
tant in the past so that conditions may be easily recalled, and 
(3) the data in the base period must be trustworthy. However, 
it is argued by other statisticians that the base period can be 
of considerable importance. Two reliable authorities present 
the following reasons for the desirability of havitg a recent 
period as a base: "'(1) the dispersion of price relatives becomes 
so great that no average is reliable; (2) the pattern of consump-
tion changes to such an extent that no aggregate of commodities 
can be found which includes the major expenditures common to 
both periods; (3) the quality of many commodities, nominally the 
same, progressively change with time." 1 ~om this they point 
out that an index number becomes more and more meaningless the 
farther away it is from the base period. In 0rder to have re-
liable index numbers it is essential to o~ange the base period 
frequently, especially in times of rapidly changing economic 
activity. 
one of the criteria of a good index number is that its com-
ponents must be fairly homogeneous. For example, you cannot in-
clude wage rates, interest rates and commodity; prices in an in-
dex and hope to get anything that is reliable or meanin~l. 
This is a definite limitation of index numbers. The basic argu-
1. Croxton and Cowden, A~~lied General Stat.istics, New York: 
Prentice Hall, Inc. 1 9, p. 586. 
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ment directed at the use or highly heterogeneous components in 
an index number is that a "typical" figure is not likely to be 
arrived at when the heterogeneous components are averaged. Neis-
wanger gives the following example to show this: 
An average of hourly earnings of employees in a 
machine shop would be quite meaningless if wages 
of those working at hourly rates and salaries of 
supervisory employees, working on a monthly basis, 
were put into the same distribution. The many 
causes affecting the pay of operating labor are 
different in important respects from those deter-
mining the pay of supervisory and administrative 
labor. The data are not homogeneous. Consequently 
there would be a peak in the series at the point 
around which wages of the group on an hourly basis 
would concentrate and another peak showing the con-
centration of the more highly paid supervisory la-
bor. An average including wages of both groups 
would be typical of neither. It would be too 
high for fhe hourly workers - too low for the mon-
thly men. 
Then Neiswanger states in a later chapter: 
We may conclude that if an index number is to be 
meaningful and serve a useful purpose, the varia-
tions summarized in the index must be reasonably 
similar as to sign and magnitude so that a change 
in the index may be viewed as representative or . 
"typical"' of the change in the data comprising it. 2 
An important point in connection with the use of index num-
bers to price milk is that it is based on historical price rela-
tionships. The New York Milkshed Price Committee gave five rea-
sons why this method can be defective, which are well worth 
quoting: 
1. It assumes that Class I prices in the past 
were adjusted adequately with supply and de-
mand conditions. That Class I prices at times 
1. Neiswanger, op. cit., p. 248. 
2. Ibid. t p. 409. 
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-~~-·--~~ ---=-~-=== H~wever, the eam]anents of tke formula index are examimea-o-m~~ 
by one in an attempt to determime their desirability im. refere:m.~e 
to su:p:ply and demand conditions in the Boston milk market. I 
~lae drafters of the Class I f0rm.ula wish.ed. te include somel 
measure of coasumer demand iB New Englamd. Tkey studied eight I 
available indices that they felt might measure consumer demand,~ 
and came to the conclusion that the Boston Federal Reserve Dis~iot 
Department Store Sales I:ndex was the "'most ap:pro])riaten~ index t$. 
use. Appendix C is a grapl\l of all indexes considered and the 
mo.ney spent for milk. A.:,clese observation of the graph reveals 
tkat the Committee was justified im. saying tkat the Department 
store Sales Index nwas more closely. associated with. ckanges in /
11 
expenditures far milk tkan amy other measure~. However, it 
can also be see:n that the series on the Department S>tore Sales j 
and the Meney Spe:nt for Milk did not always fluetuat,e in. a simi]ar 
II 
mammer. In many instances the store sales go up while the amo~t 
of mamey spent for milk goes down 8.l!l.d viee versa. Also, there ~~ 
is: na definite lead-lag relatiomslilip between the twe series. I 
on the basis of this, it is ratJaer dubious whether the Departme~t. 
il 
store Sales IE.dex was ever am aceurate measure of the demand. f'on milk. 
II 
i! 
1) 
1. ~he,se are: (1) Bostan Federal Reserve· District Department II 
Store Sales, (2) New E:m.gland Busimess Activity (First Na- 1 
tional Bamk of Boston), (3) Con. sumers' Price Index for Bos~1 
tom ( U.s. Department of Labor.) , ( 4). Total weekly payrolls j
1 i:m. Massachusetts (8tate Department of. Laber ana I:m.dustries} ~ 
( 5) Cost of living ilil :Massach:usetts ( 8tate Ilepartment ®f ! 
Laber a:nd Industries), ( 6) Ferse:aal I:m.eome Paym.e:m.ts fer I 
Massachusetts (U.. 8. Departme:rat ef eemm.eree:) , { '7) Retail I 
prices for foeds i:m. Mass. ( 8tate Department of Labor and 1 
Industries), and {8) :ae:ra-agricultural in.e0me for tlae United 
states ( u.s. Department of C0mmeree). I 
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shed aE.d coE.sequen.tly. as an indicator ef su-pply conditions. It 
was estimated by the Committee, on the basis of several studies. 
that grai::m. and labor costs were about 60 :percent of total costs 
of :producing milk. Taking grain and labor as a total, the for-
mer is 50 :percent and tlae latter is 40 :percent of tlais total. 
Tke Gemmitteeconsidered usi:m.g an index 0f the variations i:n to-
I tal costs but discarded the idea because, TtJf cha::m.ges in. general 
I 
econ0mie conditions are to be used as one of tlae guides i:m. pri-. 
ci:ng fluid milk illl Bosto:n, it would seem unecessary and il!l.a:p-
:propriate te use t.h.e so-called cost of dairy farm.il!l.g index; for 
it i:m.cludes several factors whick change about the same time 
1 and rate as general economic co:m.dition~" There are serious: 
objections· to tkis. 
variations in costs are measured i:m. twe i:m.dexes: •. Or:lly twol 
of tlile items (labor a:md grain) are measured at the level which 
I 
I the producer pays. Fer example, the producer generally purckasrs 
his grai:m. at retail and the farm wage rates included in the i:m.d~x 
are taken at the level which the producer pays. However~ other I 
costs which are included in the u.s. Wholesale Commodity Price J 
Index are not at the level which· the producer pays. A :preduce~~~ 
seldom purchases suck items as· farm machinery, cows, etc., at li 
the :primary market level.. Tkere is consequentlJr a defiRite im.-1 
I 
consistency in this method of measuring variations in eosts. I 
It should also be noted that neither index has any such items 
I 
as insurance, property taxes, wages of management, cost of farm) 
l. Bosto:n Milkshed Price Committee,. op. cit., p •. 16~ 
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buildi:m.gs, etc. Many of these items are relativery-Stable cosfa:=:::s:41·===~=== 
am.d would have a dampening eff"ee·t. en the more rapidly fluctuatinf 
costs included iE. the formula il!ldex. The Committee did not deem.ll 
it desirable to include the wagea of management 1m tllte wagea 1l 
component because this would have give:m. labor a weight of 62 per-,1/ 
cent and graim 38 percent. Consequently, it is questionable 
1
, 
wkether tlie Committee selected measures tlaat are fairly repre-
sentative of tJJl.e variatio:ms· i:m costs. 
I It. caE. be seen that there was no real systematic approaeit I 
i:m. attempting to obtai:m a sample that would be representative oft 
I 
tlae variatio:m. in all costs of production. II Ma:m.y of the ce>s.ts: that 
II 
are generally quite rigid were omitted and the costs that -W~re /1 
includea are not all at t:m.e level which the producer pays. i By I 
I 
0mitting many costs whick have a tendency to be rigid, it is I 
I 
quite possible that the cost of productio:m phase of tke formula II 
would move i:m. ~uch a way that it would tend to overprice Class I!! 
milk i:m. times of risi:m.g prices and underprice Class I milk i:m. J
1 
· II 
As was previously stated, the Grain-Labor Index was im.cludea 
times of deelinim.g prices. 
d 
i:m. the formula iE.dex as an i:m.dicator of supply conditions. It I 
i 
was skown that this index is not a satisfactory measure of variJf 
tions i:m. productio:m. costs. I:m. using this index there is also a~ 
implicit assumption that costs of production is the sole deter~ 
I 
minant of sup~ly. The New York Milkshed Prioe Committee in its I 
study concluded that costs of production was not :m.ecess~ily a ~~ 
reliable indicator of supply coE.ditions. O:m. this topie, it s:ai '', 
"The relative importance of costs of productio:m. o~ the supply o·l 
li 
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ae eome statisticians argue, that wmdghts are not as important 
in an index as it is supposed, this is not a serious objection. 
The other objection is that the base period is too far removed. 1 
It was explained earlier .in this chapter that a remote base pe-
riod has a tendency to make the index meaningless.2 Thi.s could 
very well be true of the United States Wholesale Commodity Price 
Index which rose so rapidly during and after World. War II. It 
is argued that m ••• while dispersion tends to rise and fall with 
the rate of change in the price· index, a measure· of the amount 
of dispersion is significant because the greater it becomes the 
less faith we can put in the index." 3 
Another objec-t-ion to the United States Wholesale Commodity 
price Index is that, ~ ••• this price index, covering nearly 900 
series for roughly 500 connn.odities omits coverage on some com-
modities which fluctuate little over the business cycle and there-
~ore slightly exaggerate the cyclical fluctuation." 4 From this 
argument it can be said that there is a possibility that the 
Unitedi States Wholesale Commodity Price Index would have a ten-
dency to overprice Class I milk through the formula in times o:r 
rising prices and underprice Class I milk in times of falling 
prices. 
It is reasonable to question. whether the United states Whole-
sale Commodity Price Index is a measure of general economic con-
ditions. '!'he Committee was not clear on what it meant by general 
1. Ibid. 
2. see p. 54. 
3. Bratt, op. cit., :LP• 386-7. 
4. Ibid., p. 386. 
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economic conditions. nis is a rather b-read term wlaich is· not r 
easily definable. Tlae 0ommittee stated that the index has, m·•1 
co.m.e te> 'be recog:m.ize<ft. as the best si:m.gle. measure of the general / 
I 
price level in this comatry. By the same toke:a, this index is 
recognized as t:Jae lile:st single measure of general eco:raomic con-
ditions which is readily available.nl Thel1t it went on to say, ( 
II 
"An examinatiom. of the index e>f tlae general price le,vel snows 11 
tl!l.at its m0vements are very cl®sely associated wi tla caanges II 
I' i:m. prices pai<i by far.m.ers for commodities used in productio:m. ruJ\. 
familymai:ntenan.ce. The:m. too, they are closely asseciated witk 
""" i · · "' 2 I cuanges :m consumer l.E.comes. 
'I 
II If the Boston Milkshed Price Committee considered ge:m.eral 
economic co:nditions as being equivalent to general business 
1
1 
activity, it had no real justificati0la in using this index. I 
Bratt makes the fQll:.owing statement on th.e United States Whole~ 
1
1 
sale Comm.odi ty PTice Index: ~~ 
Empirically prices lll.ave bee:n found to move generally 
with activity, althcmglil important e:x:ce:wtions occur 
when productivity is rising rapidly or when demand 
is weak at low levels ef the secondary trend. Twenty 
years age prices were frequently used te represeat 
changes in activity, but the me~sure is not c0mmo:m.ly 
applied for this purpose today. 
Tlile Committee was probal:>:ly mG>re inte~restedt ilil the tbree 
fellowing specific plaases: (1) prices ef commodities usea by 
farmers in productielll, (2) the cost of living af farmers, and 
(3) the level ef consumer incomes. This is probably what the 
1. Boston Milksh.ed Price Committee, op. cit., p. 20. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Bratt, op. cit., p. 363. 
I 
I 
I 
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committee u:m.derstood by ge:m.eral eco:aomic conditioms. Adm.itted:.ll 
there has been at times considerable correlation eetweem these . 
three phases and the Umited States Wholesale Commodity Price Illl-
dex, but there have been ~imes whem %X±x eorrelatiom did n~t e~]~~st. 
The Cemmitte itself pointe& this 0ut, but then seemed to d1sre-l 
gard it as bei:m.g unimporta:m.t. Ha~ the Committee shown that the1e 
existed a close relation.slaip at all times between the three 
phases it was loG>king for and the United States Wh0les·ale Com-
modity Price Index, it would have been somewhat justified in 
usim.g this iE.dex, but as it stands there was. a forei:m.g of rela-
1 
I tionships. If the Cemnnittee had really beem interested i:m. thes1 
I' three :plil.ases, it seems that it would laave chosen more direct an I 
more appr0priate measures of these phases. Since retail prices 
are what the farmer pays for commodities that he uses to pro~ 
duce milk and alse for living expenses it is quite absurd to usl 
an index 0f wholesale prices. A measure of consumer income was II 
iE. a sense included in t:ne Department Store Sales Index and J 
t1ilere was JiH.> need to include it ill another index. :m addition j 
to this, consumer income generally lags behind wholesale prices 
and is therefore not appropriately represented by aE. i.m.dex of 
I 
wh0lesale prices. I 
It has bee.m. suggested that the formula index is so constructed 
that it may lilave a tel'lde1!1.cy to overstate Class I milk prices iE.
1
1 
relation to local supply and demand conditions and also general· 
economic conditions in periods of rising business activity and 
to UE.derstate Class I milk prices in periods of declining business 
activity and declining prices. It will n0w be shoWR that the I 

tke 1925-29 base period 
was not the proper one. 
not consider the degree of discriminative marketing that took 
]>'lace i:a the 1925-29 perioa. It must be remembereG. that there 
was ne government regulation of milk prices at that time. The 
cooperatives were in a strong positi011 and so were the hamdlers. 
The e0:m.sumer was given much less consideration than he is given 
even mow. Proof of the degree of discrimi:m.ati ve marketing at 
that time is impossible and consequently a strong peint canaot 
be made of this. It is suspect-ed, however, om the basis of the 
stro:m.g producer and ha:m.dler orga:m.izations, that discriminative 
marketing must hav~ taken place te a co:asiderab:le degree in the! 
1925-29 perioCil. If this were t:m.e case, thel!l the Class I price 
than 
would have been greater if discriminative marketing practices II 
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fumction1 in the &airy industr;-has ~ange& oonsiaerab1y simcelrc,,~,~~'C 
!: 
1925-29. Examples of this are the use of better ereeas of mil~ 
jf 
cows, better feea rations, more milking machiE.es, im:preved farm! 
II I, 
maclli.E.ery, ete. Normally, tlae pr<Dduction functiolll. of an imdusll 
try changes when it will reduce e0sts ef producti®n. It- is· qu~te 
. !I 
reaso.E.able to believe that this is what has happened i.E. the il 
i 
B®sto:m. Milkshed. In. a study of the cost of productio:m. or milk I 
on 195 selected farms in Vermont ror tJae year ending May 31, 1lt46, 
it was found t~at the cost of producing milk decreases wken: 2 
1. TJae number of cews per farm increases. I 
i) 
li 
I 
I 
2. The number of cows handled per man increases. 
3. The capital investment per man increases. 
4. Tlile milk produc'tion per cow increases. 
5. Tlile :production of milk is more evem througk- II 
II 
II 
1938 ::: :0::::1:~:ky::k::o:t::::t~:: ::~:: ::.:::: ::1::::Y I 
out the year., 
per producer i:!l 1938 was 183.6 pounds of milk, whereas im 19~811 
the average was 272.6. If daily average deliveries were ava1- ,: 
II j: 
lable for the 1925-29 period, undoubtedly it would be found that 
! 
I 
! 
the increase i.E. average daily production per :producer from 
1925-29 t<D 1948 was much greater than from 1938 to 1948. Fremll 
L 
li 
1: 
I! 
1. TJae production function i.E.volves the quantities of the various 
inputs and the method of combining them to obtain outputs )J1 
i.E. an industry. 
1 2. Tremblay, RaymonGI. H., Cost of ProducinfMilk in Vermont, 1945-46, 
University of Vermont and State Agricu tural Experiment Station, 
Bulletin 549, :pp. 9.,.13. jj 
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this it can be deduced that there has been a trend in increased 
number G>f cows per producer or increased. production per cow or 
both. Relating this to the findings of the Vermont Agricultura~ 
Experimen.t Station, there is reason to believe that this has I 
contributed to decreasing the costs of producing milk in the I 
Boston Milksked. 
If it is assumed. that the capital inve·stment per farm has 
iRcreased in the Boston MQlksked, it can again be said that thi~ 
is another factor which has lead to decreasing the cost of pro- I 
ducing milk in the Boston Milkshed. This assumption is not bacJed 
by figures, but it is believed to be sufficiently reasonable ma II 
i 
the basis of general observation of what has taken :place in thel 
dairy industry over a·>period. of 20 to 25 years. The :production 
0f milk was :probably more even during the 1925~29 period than 
it was duri:mg and immediately after World War II, but the se.a-
sonal adjustment provisiol!l was put into the formula to obtain 
more eveR pr0duction. Tkat this mere even production lilas eeen 
realized is shown in Chapter IV. 
I . 
It is believed on the basis of this evidence that it can b~ 
concluded that the 1925-29 price is too high in relation to a 
:price that would be determined in the absence of discriminative 
to 
marketing and also in relation changing real costs of :producti0n. 
The use of $3.19 as a base price contributes to the overpricing 
of Class I milk in the formula. 
A final comment on the formula index relates to the bracke · 
system that is used in coRRection with it. The Class I prices 
are in intervals of 22¢ which may permit the formula index to 
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duct ion than that ef recent years'''~. Tlae meth®d by wllieh it was 
hoped that this objective could be attained is explained in 
Chapter II. Briefly, it involves the payment of a price equal 
ts that produced by the formula under the first and third quar-
ters of the year; a price of 44¢ below the formula index price 
in the second quarter and a price 44¢ above the formula index 
price in the fourth quarter of the year. 
There is mueh rigidity in this method. It is predicated 
OE. past experience. Periods tlaat were C®nsidered to have a 
reasonable seasonal pattern were selected as a basis for de-
termining tlae percentages of blended price differentials that 
would be needed to attain a desirable seasonal pattern or pro-
duction at the present time. 
Two periods were selected which were believed to laave rea-
so:m.able seasonal patt.erns of production. These were 1921-28 in 
which the November-December blended price exceeded tlae May-June! 
I price by 34.5 percent; and 1937-40 in which the price differential 
II 
l 
averaged 40 percent. The 40 percent differential was selected I 
because it corresponded more closely to the findings in a sur- 1: 
vey study made by the Vermont Agricultural Experiment Station 
in 1947 on this subject. Tlaere is a noteworthy difficulty in 
II 
II 
·j 
this approach because there is no way of establislaing definitel~ 
whether the different<I.U W!ls entirely a seasonal differential ~~ 
or if it was due to some extent to the cyclical fluctuations in 1 
I 
the price. This is agood example of the weakness in using his- 1 
torical price realtionships to make projections in the future. 
Another problem is that of determining whether producers 
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behind the supply-demand adjustment factor is that prices will 
fluctuate up and down as production and cons'Ulllption change. If' 
production increases while consumption remains the same, the 
price must fall; and if production decreases while consumption 
increases the price must rise. 
Unfortunately this principle is used to only a limited ex-
tent in the formula. It serves: merely as an inadequate safe-
guard. In other words, it is given a minor role. It permits 
the utilization of milk to fluctuate within the 33 to 41 percent 
limits and when either of these.:.'. limits are exceeded, a single 
price adjustment is permitted. Its inadequacy is well demon-
strated in Chapter IV and is discussed at further length there. 
It has been suggested that the bracket system and a single 
upward or downward revision of price through the supply-demand 
' 
adjustment factor would tend to bring about a rigidity in the 
price of' Class I milk. Further rigidity can be introduced in 
the formula by the contraseasonal provision and the limitation 
on the supply-d.emand adjustment factor described in Chapter II. 
It is quite clear that these can work in direct opposition to 
the results produced. by both the formula index and the supply-demand 
adjustment provision. There is no sound reason for their in-
clusion in the formula unless there be fear of what the formula 
might produce without them. It is true that the formula could 
work in such a way that there would be an "apparen~'removal of 
seasonal price differences. However, seasonal price differences 
still exist in terms of changin.g average prices. Actually . 
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there would be a seas®nal price dif1'ereiil.ce iiil the absence o:f th / 
contraseasenaal provisioiil and the limitatima en the supply-demand! 
adjustment provisiolil even if there were a change in. the average 
price. It seems t~at these limitations work counter to the ob-
jectives of the formula. Stated simply, they d0 not permit the 
p~ice of milk to fluctuate at all times in accordance with the 
changimg comditioms. 
Many serious objections nave been raised in this chapter as 
to the soundness of the various parts o:f the formula. Am over- \ 
all view of the formula iiil.dex, disregarding the rigidities iiil. 
the formula, leads one to believe that it would overprice milk 
im relatioE. to actual supply and demand eonditioiil.S iiil the up-
turn of the cycle and rmderprice it in the downturm. T1llis is 
~ue to the nature of the United states Wholesale Commodity P~ic~ 
,, 
Index, aiil.d the ommission of many costs of production which are 
likely to be rigid. Also, it was s1llowm that the 1925-29 base 
period would tend to overprice milk im all phases of the busine s 
cycle. 
When the formula was drawn up and a~ter it went into effec~ 
our ecoiil.omy was still in a period of rising economic activity. 
rt is believed then, that this formula was a proper one to bring 
Ji 
relatively high milk prices, which was perltaps. one of the reasel:lis 
wky it was so widely acaepted by producers. IB tae Marek 1948 I 
issue 0f the New Engl~d Dairyman is found a ta.ble c0mpariiil.g ac,\ual 
prices with prices t~at woula have beeR realizea through the fo~­
mula from J"8Jlluary 194? to March li48. Table 2. om page 75 is a I 
' 
reproduction of tb.at table. The actual price is Iil.0 criteriom 
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TABLE 2: 
Boston Market 
Actual and Formula Prices 
as Proposed by Bosto:m. Price Committee1 
Month Actual Price Formula Price Difference 
1947 
Jlamuary $5.65 $5.21 -$0.44 
February 5.21 5.21 
Marek 4.77 5.21 .;. .44 
April 4.77 4.77 
May 4.33 4.77 .;. .44 
J"u:m.e 4.33 4.77 .44 
J'uly 4.77 5.43 .66 
August 5.21 5.65 .44 
September 5.21 5.65 .44 
october 5.65 6.09 .44 
November 5.65 6.31 .66 
Deeember 5.65 6.31 .66 
1948 
J"anuary 5.65 5.87 .22 
February 5.65 6.09* .44 
March 5.65 5.87 .2.2 
April 5.43 (est.) I 
* 
The Department's report made two minor changes in the i~dex j 
facters - use of a 3 m0nths• moving average of departmemt s~~re 
sales; a:nd the latest 4 weeks 0f feed price quotations. ':Th-~e 
changes would have resulted in a price of $5~87 for Feb., 19~8. 
1. New England Dairyman, March 1948, p. 7. 
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of the correct priee. · However, this table is given to shew that 
producers were mot likely to lsese for some time if they accepted 
this formula. At the Hearings, the Committee was accused of ha-
~ ving first rouMd a desirable prioe level ror milk a~d then pro- I 
eeediRg to work· out a formula that would fit in with this desired 
price level for milk. This accusation is speculative and is not 
held Ol\le way or the other in this thesis. Nevertheless, it is 
colilclude~ that the price level of Class I milk attained through 
the formula was favorable to the producer at that time. That 
the price of Class I milk has been actually too high iR relation 
to supply and demand conditions is demonstrated im the following 
chapter. 
Chapter IV 
THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW CLASS I MILK PRICE 
FORMULA 
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This chapter deals with the apparent e~~ects the ~ormula 
has produced on the supply of milk and the demand for Class I 
milk from April 1948 to March 1950. It was shown in Chapter III 
that the formula would tend to overstate Class I prices because 
of the usage of 1925-29 as a base period. Also, it was shown 
that the formula index might have a tendency to overstate Class 
I prices in the upswing of the business cycle. This chapter 
shows that there has not been an equilibrium between the supply 
of milk and the demand for Class I milk in the Boston milkshed 
and Boston marketing area. It cannot be shoWll definitely that 
the ~ormula has been responsible for this disequilibrium. How-
ever, it can be said that the formula has not served in such a 
way as to bring about a balance between the supply of milk and 
the demand for Class I milk. 
This ohb.pter al·so contains an examination of the behavior of 
the separate indices in the formula index and the effects they 
have had on the price of Class I milk. The interrelationships 
between Class I and Class II and blended prices is examined to 
establish the role played by the Class I price·. 
Finally some of the ef~eots the formula has had on producers, 
handlers, and consumers are reviewed briefly. Since there are 
no concrete criteria on which to base conclusions on the relative 
comparative positions of the producers, handlers, and consumers 
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there is no attempt in this thesis to determine which group has 
definitely been in the most advantageous position under the for-
mula. It is shown, however, that the producer has been reaso-
nably well off, and that there has not been much apparent chan~ 
in the position of the handler. A statistical appraisal of the 
consumer's position is out of question because of the want of 
adequate reference points. A more definite stand on his position 
is taken up in the concluding chapter where it is related to 
the preparation that went into introducing the formula and to 
the underlying philosophy of the formula. 
Practically all the statistics used in this chapter are 
those taken from releases by the Boston Federal Milk Marketing 
Administrator's Office and are used without reference to footnotes. 
Many of the percentage figures, sums, and statistical measures 
have been computed by the author from figures supplied by the 
Marketing Administrator's Office. All other statistics used 
in this chapter are referred to in footnotes. 
An examination of the data on the utilization of Class I 
milk in the Boston Marketing Area shows what has happened to the 
major portion of the demand for Class I . milk since the formula 
went into effect. 
1.938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
TABLE 3 
Class I Milk Used in the Boston Marketing Area 
by Years 
582,412 
578,503 
571,201 
596,120 
(In thousands of pounds) 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
631,993 
660,713 
684,414 
712,063 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
733,968 
707,743 
698,054 
702,876 
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From table 3 it can be seeR that there was a great increase 
in the consumption of milk duril!l.g the War years. in the Boston m I 
keti:ng area. But after 1946 censumption started to decline and 
thiS decline continued after the formula went into effect. It wruld 
be unfair to compare the consumptio:m. ef fluid milk in 1948 and 
1949 witk what existed during the War years,. particularly 1945 
and also 1946· when many economic war measures were still on. 
Duri:zag World War II incomes had reached great heights, which it 
is believed had a great influence on the amount of milk consume~ 
i:za the Bost.o.m marketin.g area. There was alsq the rat.ioni.mg of j 
many foods while milk remained unrationed during the War. This 
caused milk to be substituted for many ef the foods. that were 
rationed. A eompariso.m ef the consumption of milk in 1948 and 
1949 with the years prier to tl!le War is· very favorable. CG>nsumlr 
tion, for instance, in 1949 was 106,466,000 :pounds above that II 
I 
of 1941. This increase is due probably to an increase i:m. popu- 1 
lation in the marketing area, an increase in incomes, and to 
a retention of milk consumption habits that were started during 
the War years. 
It would be difficult to determine how much more milk than 
this would have been consumed in the marketing area iR 1948 and 
1949 if the :price to the consumer had been lower. The question 
of a price which would bring about an nideal~ am@unt of consumption 
is out of the realm of economics and is therefore net discussed 
here. The oE.ly conclusion that is drawn is that the effective . 
demand for milk in the Boston marketing area does not appear to 
be out of line withp:pre-war years and most of the war years. 
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That the amount consumed in 1949 exceeded that of 1948 shows in 
a sense that the formula is not working in such a way as to bring 
about a reduction in the effective demand for Class I milk in 
the Boston marketing area. 
The greatest reduction that took place after the War in 
class I milk utilization was that going to outside markets.l 
TABLE ~ 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
54,453 
59,370 
49,368 
70,361 
Class I Milk Shipped to Outside 
Markets 
(In thousands of pounds) 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
90,853 
158,718 
178,837 
223,907 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
234,175 
182,750 
180,684 
121,442 
The amount of milk shipped to outside markets in 1949 was 
59,242,000 pounds below that of 1948 and 112,733,000 below that 
of 1946, the peak year of the twelve-year period. The reduction 
in the amount of milk going to outside markets was attributable 
to two known causes the most important of which was the friction 
with the New York market. The New York market permitted the sale 
of part of its surplus milk as Class IC milk in unregulated mar-
kets. Class IC milk was bought by handlers at a much lower price 
Boston 
than the Class I milk could be bought by handlers. The New York 
handlers paid 20¢ above the blended ~ice for this Class IC milk 
and could consequently sell it in the southern New England markets 
from 65¢ to $1.00 cheaper than the Boston handlers who had to 
sell their milk according to the Class I price in Boston. In 
1. Outside markets are those markets adjoining the Boston 
marketing area which purchase Boston pooled milk. 
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this way the New York milkshed took a sizable portion of the 
1 
market which had previously been supplied by the Boston market. 
Another reason for the decrease in sales to outside markets was 
that some of the plants which had been in the Boston pool were 
removed and sold Class I milk to the secondary markets of southern 
New England. This also had the effect of reducing the amount 
of Class I milk going to outside markets from the Boston poo1. 2 
TABLE 5 
Percentages of Class I Milk Going to Outside· Markets 
and to the Boston Marketing 
Area 
Percentage of Class I Milk 
Going to Outside Markets to 
Total Class I Milk 
Year 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Percentage 
10.0% 
9.3 
8.0 
10.6 
12.6 
19.2 
20.7 
23.9 
24.2 
20.5 
20.6 
14.7 
Percentage of Class I Milk 
Utili.z:ed in Marketing Area 
to Total Class I Milk 
Year 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Percentage 
90. 0% 
9l '~7 
92.0 
89.4 
87.4 
81.8 
79.3 
76.1 
75.8 
79.5 
79.4 
85.3 
The amount of Class I milk shipped to outside markets in 
1949 when compared to pre-war years takes on a different aspect. 
The amount of Class I milk used in the Boston marketing area in 
1948 was about 120 percent of the amount used in 1938 but the 
amount of milk shipped to outside markets in 1948 was about 280 
1. 
2. 
New England DairYjan, October 1949, p. 3. 
!bid., pp. 3 and o. 
83 
percent of the amount shipped in 1938. In 1949 the amount of 
Claee I milk shipped to outside markets was about 200 percent 
of that shipped in 1938. Th ratios of Class I milk utilization 
in the marketing area to total Class I milk; and of Class I milk 
shipped to outside markets to total Class I milk are shown on 
table 5, page 82. These ratios indicate the increasing importance 
that milk shipped to outside markets took during the War and 
after the war. However, the ratio of Class I milk is still well 
above what it was prior to the War. 
Looking at the utilization of milk as whole in table 6, 
it is found that the year 1949 still compares favorably with 
prewar years. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
TABLE 6 
Total Class I Milk Utilization 
(In thousands of pounds) 
646,865 
637,873 
620,5_67 
666,481 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
722,846 
817,429 
863,251 
935,9?0 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
968,143 
890,493 
878,738 
824,118 
The most disturbing results arising out of the Class I price 
formula is the tremendous increase in total receipts. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
TABLE 7 
Total Receipts of Milk from 
All Sources 
1,070,108 
1,128 , 85? 
1,195 ~;775 
1,231,955 
(In thousands of pounds) 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1,254,485 
1,250,004 
1,344,776 
1,398,518 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1,2?6,857 
1,3?2,554 
1,341,242 
1,496,492 
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Total receipts in 1949 exceeded those of 1941 by 264,537,000 
pounds, 1945 by 97,974,000 pounds, 1946 by 219,635,000, and 1948 
by 155,250,000 pounds, but on the other hand total milk utiliza-
tion in 1941 was 157,637,000 pounds less than in 1949, 1945 was 
111,852,000 pounds more than in 1949, 1946 was 144,025,000 pounds more 
than in 1949 and 1948 was 54,620,000 less than in 1949. In ge-
neral total milk receipts increased by larger amounts in 1949 
relative to previous years than the reduction in total Class I 
milk utilization in 1949 relative to previous years. 
It is quite apparent that since the formula has been in 
affect the reduction in the percentage of receipts assigned to 
due 
class I milk has been to a considerable extent to the increase 
in total milk receipts and to a lesser extent to the reduction 
in Class I milk utilization. The reduction in Class I milk uti-
lization percentages is shown in table 8. 
1938 
1.939 
1940 
1941 
60,4% 
56.5 
52.3 
54.1 
TABLE 8 
Percentage of Receipts Assigned to 
Class I Milk 
1942 57.6% 
1943 65.4 
1944 64.2 
1945 66.9 
From table 8 it can be seen that there was 
1946 75.gfo 
1947 64.9 
1948 65.5 
1949 55.0 
a drop of 10 
percentage points in the utilization of Class I milk from 1948 
to 1949, and 20 percentage points from the 1946 high. The per-
centage of Class I milk in 1949 was at about the same level as 
that which existed between 1939 and 1942. However, it was 4 
percentage points less than the minimum of 59 percent and 12 
percentage points less than the maximum of 67 percent which 
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are stated in the present Federal Order No·~ 4. 
In spite of the great increase in the production of milk 
there was a considerable improvement in the seasoaal pattern ... 
of production brought about by the seasonal price differences. 
The ratios of November to June receipts are shown in table t. 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
TABLE 9 
Ratios of November to dune Receipts from Producers 
59.0% 
55.7 
59.1 
59.7 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
57.1% 
51.6 
54.7 
46.8 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
57.0% 
48.6 
61.3 
59.9 
In 1948 and 1949 the ratios of November to June were higher than 
those that existed from 1938 to 1947. They were much higher tBan 
those of the war years but only slightly higher than those of 
pre-war years. From 1938 to 1942 there had been some seasonal 
differentials in Class I prices but they were not as regular as 
they are under the present formula. During World War II there 
were no seasonal differentials at all. Consequently, tt can be 
said that seasonal price differentials have considerable bearing 
on bringing about a smaller difference in production between the 
months of lowest and highest production. 
A more refined method of measuring the changes in the seasonal 
pattern of production is through some measureof dispersion. The 
standard deviation of monthly production for a year can be used 
as a measure of the dispersion in milk production which would show 
how much the monthly milk receipts from producers varies from the 
ari thm.etic mean for the year. Since milk production has incre·ased 
tremendously from 1938 to 1949, a comparison of the years could 
be made only if the standard deviations were converted into coef-

i 
I 
I 
87 
I amount of seasmo.al fluctuation i>L pred.uetio>t i~a the absence of i! 
I seasonal Glass I price di~~erences than there was prior to the ll 
I war and a~ter. the War wken the price dif~erences were in e~~ect. 1 
I The seasomal price dif~erentials, it may be added., have bee· 1 
,\ 
• ·r 
ef~ective i:m. attaini:mg a ratiG o~ November and December receipts! 
to May and J"u:ne receipts witni:m. th.e limits set up by the Bost0n I 
I
I 
percent. In 1949 the Noveml:Der and December receipts were S,Q,.:l 
:Milkshed Price Committee. These limits were between f3,Q and 65 
J 
perce:e.t o~ tlae receipts in May and J"une. It can be said, "them~:· ·· 
I that the new formula has attained one o~ the objectives set up 
by the Boston Milkshed Price Committee. I 
An examimation of the e~fects. o~ the ~ormula i::adex reveals tl 
that it brought ~our ch.anges in the Glass I price from April 194~ 
through Marek 1950. The firs.t. was::', an increase of 22:¢ ~or Augustll 
1948, and the following three changes were decreases of 22¢ in 
I: 
The fG>rmula index rl 
ri october 1948, February 1949, and J"uly 1949. 
operated in such a way as to bring about a de:erease o~ 44¢ in 
~be Glass I price from April 1948 to March 1950. 
il li 
II 
I 
I 
I 
Table 11 is a summaticm of the percentage influences of t11e I 
compenents of the formula index on the Glass I price. 
TABLE 11 
Percentage I::afluence of Gemponents 
of the Formula Index on 
Glass I Prices from April 
1948 to March 1950 
I 
II 
i 
i 
I 
II Date of 
change in 
Glass I price 
Wholesale 
Commodity 
Price Index 
Department 
Store Sales 
IE.dex 
d 
Grain-Labor 11 
Index 
August 1948 27.0% 68.0% 5. o% 
October 1948 -29.6 -27.8 157.4 
February 1949 44.8 65.5 -12.3 I 
========**~~~ ~~49r==========~4~==========~N0~~·==========64,~========W========= 
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From the above table it can be seen that the Grain~Labor In-
dex has had the greatest influence in changing the Class I price. 
The Department Store Sales Index was second in importance and 
the Wholesale Commodity Price Index was last. It is interesting 
to note also that in every price change one index contributed to 
more than 60 percent in the change. Als;o in the second and third 
changes, the indices moved in opposite directions. These two 
tacts bear out well the lack of close relationship between the 
formula index components. It shows that they fluctuate in a 
much dissimilar fashion. 
The components are tabulated in table 12 on page 89 and 
are plotted in chart 1 on page 90. The indexes have had the 
1 following ranges in the period from April 1948 to March 1950: 
the Wholesale Commodity Price Index, 18.4; the Department Store 
sales Index, 18.1; and the Grain-Labor Index, 23.42. There was 
not too much dissimilarity in the ranges of the movements of the 
three indices. However, the essential difference between the 
three indices is the degree each fluctuated in this period. 
Chart 1 shows that the Department Store Sales Index fluctuated 
quite violently. This leads one to question whether this index 
is truly representative of consumer buying power. Logically, 
it does not appear to be so. It seems much more doubtful when 
it is remembered that the index used in the formula ia a three 
months' moving average of the monthly index computed by the 
Federal Reserve System. If Department Store Sales are truly 
indicative of consumer buying power , the apparent erratic nature 
I. The months of the indices referred to in this chapter are 
the months for which the milk was priced and are not the 
months of the indices themselves. Also the indices are 
on a 1925-29 base period. 
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TABLE 12 
Component Indices of the Formula Index 
e) for Pricing Class I Milk from April 1948 to March 1950 
Wholesale 
Co:nlmodity Department Grain- J 
Price store lsales Grain Labor Labor Formu!_a 
Month Indexl Index Indexl Inde:x:l Inde:x:l Index 
1948 
April 164 180 197.3 204 200 181 
May 164.7 179 197.2 - 207.3 201 182 
June 166 183 198.7 207.3 202 184 
July 167.1 188 196.1 207.3 201 185 
Aug. 169.6 194 191.3 216.6 201 188 
Sept. 172 198 174.3 216.6 191 187 
Oct •. 172.8 197 163 216.6 184 185 
Nov. 171.9 197 159 222.1 184 184 
IDee. 168.4 191 159.2 222.1 184 181 
1949 
Jan. 167.2 188 166.7 222.1 189 181 
Fe·b. 165.5 186 164.5 217.1 186 179 
!'Mar. 163.9 190 157.9 217.1 182 179 
I April 161.3 192 153.5 217.1 179 177 
May 161.6 182. 156.2 211.1 178 174 
Jwae 160.1 183 156.2 211.1 178 174 
July 158.9 186 149 211.1 174 173 
Aug. 157,.6 194 148.2 206.2 171 174 
I Sept. 156.5 187.6 150.5 206.2 172.8 172 
oct. 156.1 185 149.1 206.2 172 171 
Nov. 156.8 186 149.4 202.6 171 171 
Dec. 155.3 180.4 148.4 202.6 170.1 169 
1950 
Jan. 154.7 181 151.3 202.6 172 169 
Feb. 154.4 179.9 152 198.7 170.7 168 
Mar. 154.7 189.9 149.1 198.7 17!1 171 
- 1. ContTerted to a 1925..,.29 base period. 


iE. determining the price of milk. I 
In Chapter III it is shown that the indexes select.ed would II 
produce a price that was toe high in the upturn of the business 
cycle. It is shown in the beginming of t~is chapter that 
the price of Class I milk seemed to be too high in relation to 
supply and demand conditions. Whether we mad reached a turning 1 
point before March 1950 was questionable t0 a certaim extent. ,I 
However, judgi:B.g from the formula index, it ca::e. be said that we 
had. It should follow then that Glass I milk was beiE.g under-
I 
priced by Marcbl 1950. T~ere are two possible explanations of Jj 
why it was not bei:ag underpriced. One of these is that we had I 
not gone into the d.owntur:a. sufficiently to have had an. apprecia .1
1
le 
efrect in_giving the formula index a downward bias. The other 
is that the 1925-29 period so over priced Class I milk that it ,i 
more than coUE.teracted any downward bias the formula index might 
have had at that time. 
That the Class I price was toe high is substantiated by thi 
experience with the supply-demand adjustment provision. This 
provision was put into use in October, 1949 when the percentage 
of Class II milk had reached 41.8 for the 12 months ending .Augu~,t 
1949. However, the 41 percent had been exceeded for the pricinJ 
I 
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of Class I milk in September of 1949 but the supply-demand adjust-
ment provision was not put into operation because of the contra-
seasonal provision. The 44-cent reduction from the prices called 
for by the formula index remained in effect from October 1949 
until after March 1950. It had no effect in reducing the per-
centage of Class II milk but on the contrary, the Class II per-
centage increased. For the pricing of milk in October 1949 the 
Class II percentage was 41.8; for November 1949, 42.4; for Dec-
ember 1949, 43.4; for January 1950, 44.2; for February 1950, 44.7; 
for March 1950, 45.1; and for April 1950, 45.6. Incidentally, 
the 44-cent reduction has not been cumulative. It is pointed 
out in Chapter III that this is the weakness of the provision. 
However, the inverse relationship between the 44.-cent reduction 
that did take place and the increasing percentage of Class II 
milk seemed to indicate that the Class I price was out of line 
with market conditions. 
The Class I price: as hae been shown plays a considerable 
role in the determination of the supply of milk but it by no 
means the only factor. This is explained in the following para-
graphs. The Class I price formula is important from the stand-
point of the production of milk in that it ie one of the deter-
minants of the blended price. The blended price is what the pro-
ducer receives and is one of the bases on which he makes his pro·-
duction decisions. It is important to remember that the producer 
is not directly influenced in his production decisions by the 
Class I price. An examination of the factors which have produced 
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changes in the blended price are quite revealililg. I:f seasonal 
:price dif:ferences in the Class I :price are disregarded, the 
blended :price in March 1950 was $1.44 below that of April 1948, 
a decrease of approximately 27 :percent. In the same period the 
Class I price dropped $0.88 :per hundredweight, a decrease e:f 
approximately 15 :percent; and the Class II price dropped $1.80 
per hundredweight, a decrease o:f ap:proxiamtely 39 :percent. It 
can be seeR that the Class II price had a much greater influence' 
in :producililg a reduction in the blended price than did the Class 
I price. I 
In addition to this the Class II :percentage had increased 
II 
coE.siderably in this :period which has had a downward e:f:fect on j, 
the blended :price. A comparison of the Class II percentages e:f 1
1 
any month to another month is difficult. This is because one 
of the causes of the variations in Glass II percentages is the 
seasonality in the production o:f milk. It would be erroneous, 
:for ex~~e, to compare the April 1948 percentage to the Marek 
1950 percentage because there is greater milk production ilil Aprii 
than March generally •. In spite of this, the Class II percentage! 
in March 1950 was 1.3 :percentage peints above that of April l948i 
I 
I 
I 
Table 13 shows the dif:ferences in the Class II percentages by 
·comparing the mom.tlas from April 1948 to March 1949 with those ofll 
April 1949 to March 1950. There were increases in all the twelve 
melil.ths of the latter year ranging from 2.9 to 15.2 percentage 
points. Co.:nsequently there is n® doubt but what the Class II 
i:percentage has had considerable weight im the reduction of the 
blended priee in this period. 
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TABLE 13 
( continued) 
Class II Prices 
Montla 1948-1949 1949":"1950 Diff'erence 
April $4.588 $2.?86 $1.802 
May 4.488 2.?11 1.??? 
J"rme 4.4?6 2.?38 1.?38 
;ruly 4.60? 2.896 1.?11 
August 4.562 3.095 1.46? 
September 4.429 3.0?9 1.350 
october 3.919 3.044 .8?5 
November 3.622 3.055 .56? 
December 3.628 3.059 .569 
J"anuary 3.213 2.992 .221 
February 3.085 2.980 .105 
March 2.911 2.?85 
_.3:£6 
Class II Percentages 
komth 1948-l949 1949~1950 · Difference 
pril 40.2% 51.8% 11.6% 
iMay 49.3 60.6 11.3 
JUlie 5? •. 5 61.2 3.? 
J"u1y 46.5 49.4 2.9 
!August 36.2 39.1 2.9 
foeptember 33.3 41.9 8.6 
ctober 25.5 40.? 15.2 
!November 19.? 33.9 14.2 
~ecember 2?.4 35.5 8.~ 
~anuary 28.6 36.4 ?.8 
ebruary 32.5 39.4 6.9 
M:arclil. 41.5 52.1 10.6 
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In analyzing the ractors that imrluenced the blended price 
in that period it is seen that the Glass I priee did n®t play 
II 
the dominant role by rar. Table 13 shows that the Glass II price 
had the greatest influence on the reduction of the blended pricl
1
 
- I 
when it dropped rrom $4.61 iR J"uly 1948 to $2.74 i:m. J"uly of' l94il 
and from that time on it remained relatively stable and had litl 
tle inrluenee om the blended price. The Glass I price changes 
exerted their greatest inrluence- arter the Glass II prices laad 
leveled orr. A review or the Glass I pric-e changes shows that 
the August 1948 increase was orfset by a 22,:-cent decrease in. -
october 1948. The 22-cent decrease in February 1949 was eon:... 
seque.n.tly the only effective change in the period w1!l.en the Glass 
. !I 
II price was dropping rapidly. The greatest change in the Glass 
!I 
I price took place from J"uly 1949 to October 1949 with a 22-een~ 
. reduction by the formula index i:m. J"uly and a 44-cent reductioE. I 
ID,Y. (;:)ctober-~··tlll'ough the supply-demand adjustment provisioE.. It _ \
I 
was also in this latter period that the Glass II percentages had 
I increased greatly. 
1
. 
In spite of the drop or $1.44 in the blended price in this[ 
period, production continued to increase. This has been sho~ , 
elsewhere in a general way. Table 14 on page 98 shows a com-
parison of milk production by months of the years ending March 
II 
1949 and. March 1950. There was greater production in each monti 
ll 
or the year ending March 1950 than there was in the corresp®ndiilg 
month or the year endi:ag Mare:m. 1949. Comparing the blended prices 
on the same basis in table 13, it is seen that in each month of' II 
. I 
the year ending March 1950 there is a lower blended price than I 
Mom.tln. 
.A:pril 
May 
J"une 
J"uly 
August 
september 
oct0ber 
November-
December 
J"a:m.uary 
February 
Marc ln. 
T.ABLE 14 
Total Milk Receipts by Months 
April 1948-March 1950 
(In thousands of pounds) 
1948-1949 
115,36? 
136,855 
154,429 
134,303 
121,604 
112,464 
104,36? 
94,003 
99,554 
100,550 
93,?99 
121,561 
98 
1949-1950 
13?,698 
1?1,109 
168,650 
141,038 
122,475 
116,559 
118,356 
99,908 
104,879 
10?,195 
101,121 
132,235 
in the corresponding months of the year ending March 1949. The 
question arises, is this nperverse elasticitytt in the supply of 
milk? Is it possible, in other words, that more milk is produeyd 
at l0wer prices? A part of this nperverse elasticity"'! can be 
explained by the fact that the cost of producing milk has un-
doubtedly decreased in this period. An indication of this is 
Index 
seen im the decline of the Grain-Labor of 29 percentage points 
from April 1948 to March 1950. A:nother.i::ndication, tlaougl:.t less 
reliable, is the drop in the United States Wholesale Commodity 
price Index of 9.3 percentage points. A reduction in the cost 
of production. would cause a shift in the supply curve from S 1 
to S.a. as snoWE. in diagram 2 on page 99. This diagram points out 
the possibility of a greater amount of milk "being offered at 
a lower price. In this hypothetic& situation, when the supply 
curve was S 1 a price~ would bring a quantity of Q, 1 0l'l the market 
With a reduction in costs the curve shifts to s. A lower pricel 
.1. 
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so that they may maintain their same gross income. This is a 
rather naive belie~ because it disregards the fact that as more 
milk is produced to maintain the same gross income the costs wil~ 
increase while the pro~its are reduced. This is quite contrary 
to the principle o~ maximization o~ pro~its • 
.Another possible and more plausible explanation o~ the nperl 
verse elastici tytt' that might exist in the supply of milk is the 
lag in producer responses to changes in the blended price. That 
there is some lag is quite feasible. Milk production cannot be 
a year, that is, instead o~ milk production. being reduced with 
blended prices there ha4 been an increase in milk produetiom.. 
part o~ this phenomenom. can be explained by reduced production 
costs. I~ it is assumed that these reduced production costs 
::r:.:::P:;·:~: ;::::::a:::e:~rt::nr:::::i;:m::n:h:~:a::eil::ic~ 
in the producer responses· to account ~or the increased. :productiol. 
It would then be necessary to say that the duration o~ thelag 
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in producer responses is more than a year. This may very well 
be true for the entry of new firms or the exit of old firms. 
In this .~, particular situation, it should involve the exit of old 
firms. Even assuming that the old firms had· not had sufficient 
time to drop out of the dairy industry, how can the increased 
production of milk be accounted for? If the blended price as 
reflected through the Class I price had been at a level that 
would bring a reduced amount of milk on the market in time, it 
should not have caused an increase in the production of milk. 
It is concluded therefore that it was more than the lag in pro-
ducer responses that brought an increased quantity of milk on 
the market. A blended price that was out of line with production 
costs was responsible to a great extent, it seems. 
The question now arises, was the blended price out of line 
because of the influence of the Class I price or the Class II 
price or both? An accurate answer to this question is difficult 
if not impossible. In an attempt to answer this question it may 
be well to quote from the preliminary report of the Boston Class 
II Price Committee which consisted of the same members as the 
class I Price Committee: 
The Class I price is the major element in 
the blended price paid the farmer since it 
is the higher price and normally is applied 
to 65 percent or so of the annual volume 
sold by farmers. Variations in the . Class I 
price, therefore, must be depended upon pri-
marily to influence both the annual level of 
milk supply and the seasonal pattern of milk 
supply. In the same way, the Class I price 
is the major factor affecting consumption or 
demand. The primary objective in Class I 
pricing, therefore, is to achieve the balance 
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price ratios compared favorably with those of 1938-40. But the 
February 1950 ratio was equal to that of the February 1938-40 
ratio and the March 1950 ratio was 3 points below that of March 
1938-40. 
Another way of viewing the position of the producer is by 
comparing the ratios of actual blended prices and Class I prices 
to the parity blended and Class I prices, computed by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. These data are compiled in a statistical 
report entitled Dairy Production and Marketing Statistics by Mr. 
James D. Lee of the Boston Federal Milk Marketing Administrator's 
Office for ~se at the 15th Annual Meeting of the North Eastern 
Dairy Conference held March 30 to April 1, 1950. These data 
are reproduced in part in table 16 on page 104 to show the position 
of the producer in the Boston milkshed. August 1919 to July 1929 
is the base period taken for the price of milk and the parity index. 
The parity index is an, " ••• index of the prices paid by all farmers 
throughout the United States for commodities used in family living 
and production, including interest and taxes."-l The parity price 
for milk is found by multiplying the average price of milk in the 
base period times the parity index. 
Table 16 shows that producers' Class I and blended prices 
were not far out of line with parity prices since the new Class 
I milk price formula went into effect. The percentages of parity 
were generally lower than what they were during the War years 
but in most cases were higher than they were any time from 1929 
to world War II. This is only a rough indication of whether 
1. Boston Milkshed Price Committee, op. cit., p.27. 
104 
TABLE 16 
New Parity Prices Compared 
To Actual Blended and Class I Prices 
Class I Prices 
(201-210 mile mone} 
Year Parity Price Actual Price Percentage o:r Parity 
1929 $ 3.26 $3.34 102% 
1930 3.20 3.23 101 . 
1931 2.85 2.08 73 
1932 2.44 1.78 73 
1933 2.42 1.79 74 
1934 2.69 2.40 89 
1935 2.86 2.58 90 
1936 2.94 2.48 84 
1937 3.12 2.31 74 
1938 2.90 2.64 91 
1939 2.94 2.66 91 
1940 3.06 2.67 87 
1941 3.25 2.77 85 
1942 3.69 3.26 88 
1943 4.03 3.73 93 
1944 4.17 4.27 102 
1945 4.23 4.32 102 
1946 4.60 4.87 106 
1947 5.30 5.10 96 
1948 5.39 5.85 105 
1949 5.30 5.44 103 
Blended Prices 
(201-210 mile zone} 
Year Parity Price Actual Price Percentage o:r Parity 
1929 $ 2.75 $ 2.75 100% 
1930 2.64 2.43 92 
1931 2.33 1.78 76 
1932 2.00 1.56 78 
1933 1.99 1.49 75 
1934 2.21 1.88 85 
1935 2.33 1.93 83 
1936 2.37 1.95 82 
1937 2.52 1.98 79 
1938 2.36 1.99 84 
1939 2.35 1.90 81 
1940 2.42 1.95 81 
1941 2.56 2.29 89 
1942 2.90 2.74 94 
1943 3.16 3 .40 108 
1944 3.33 3.95 119 
1945 3.48 4.02 116 
1946 3.87 4.72 122 
1947 4.56 4.63 102 
1948 4.87 5.37 110 1949 4.70 4.38 93 
Source: Lee, James D., Dairy Production & Marketing Statistics, . 
March 1950, p. • 
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tke Class I and blended :prices are fair :prices to th.e :producers. 
There is Ulil.doubtedly a considerable bias in using the 19~9-29 
base period for milk :prices. The same reasoning applies here 
as· was used in showing that the 1925-29 base :period would over-
:grice milk. Whelil. this is taken into considerati0n, it cam. be 
said that the :producer's positiolil is quite favorable. 
J"ust a few words will be said about the position of the haJ"':" 
dler. 'fhe ""w Class I price :formula d<>es not deal with his re -II 
sale :price and consequently does not have an absolutely deter- I 
mi:m.ing effect on his ns:pread". The handler's "'spread"' is a to-, 
pic that eould. .very well treated by itself. If it has been ne~ 
glected in this thesis, it is not because of its unimportance 
but because of its complexity and its being out of the realm of 
government price control. Little if anything of importance was 
said about the handler's ''-'spread" at the Hearings· on the Class 1 
price formula. Handlers r ws:preads'fl we·re not studied at all iE. 
TABLE 17 
Apparent Gross Margin of Boston Dealers 
(Cents per quart) 
Home delivered milk 
1945 
1948 
1949 
"1950 
7.4¢ 
8 .. 4 
8.8 
9.3 
M!ilk at stores 
1945 
1948 
1949 
1950 
5.9¢ 
6.9 
7.5 
8.5 
Source: Dairy Production and Marketing Statistics, ~ 
cit .. 1 :p. 28 .. 
the Bost0n Milkshed Price Committee's investigation. However, 
th.e gross. margilllSof the handlers are given in table 17 .~to show 
in a very inconclusive way how they have fared under the new 
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TABLE 18 
Comparison of Wholesale and Retail Prices of Milk in Boston 
Clas~ I. Price 3.7 Milk 
201-210 mile zone 
(Dollars per hundredweight) 
-Prioe 
'48 
Jan $ 5.65 
Feb 5.65 
Mar 5.55 
Apr 5;43 
May 5.43 
.run 5.43 
.ru1 5.87 
Aug 5.09 
sep 5.09 
Oct 5.31 
Nov 6.31 
Dec 6.31 
'49 
Jan 5.87 
Feb 5.55 
Mar 5.55 
Apr 5.21 
May 5.21 
.run 5.21 
.ru1 5.43 
Aug 5.43 
Sep 5.43 
oct 5.43 
NOV 5.43 
Dec 5.43 
'50 
Jan 4.99 
Feb 4.99 
Mar 4.99 
Apr 4.55 
May 4.55 
Difference 
-$0.22 
0.44 
0.22 
0.22 
-0.44 
-0.22 
-0.44 
0.22 
-0.44 
-0.44 
-Retail Price of Standard 
Milk Delivered to Homes 
(cents per quart)l 
Price 
22.0¢ 
22.0 
22.0 
21.5 
81; 5 
21.5 
22.5-23.0 
23.0-23.5 
23.0-23.5 
23.5-24.0 
23.5-24.0 
23.5-24.0 
22.5-23.0 
22.5 
22.5 
21.5-22.0 
21.5-22.0 
21.5-22.0 
22.0-22.5 
22.0-22.5 
22.0-22.5 
22.0-22.5 
22.0-22.5 
22.0-22.5 
21.0-21.5 
21.0-21.5 
21.0-21.5 
20.0-20.5 
20.0-20.5 
Differtmce 
-0.5¢ 
1.0 
0.5 
0.5 
-1.0 
-1.0 
0.5 
-1.0 
1. Fluid Milk & Cream Retort, u. s. De"Oartment of Agricultural 
Economic~, January 19 8 to May 1950~ . 
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Whether there was a justification for ;he iliterease in the- dea-=-[ 
ler' s gross margin is highly debatable. As it was previously 
1
1 
said there is no attempt in this thesis to answer that questio~. 
The only conclusion drawn from the comparison of wholesale and 
retail prices is that the bracket system has to a great degree 
tended to freeze the dealers' gross margins although there was! 
i 
some increase in the gross margins during the period in questi~n. 
An entirely speculative question arising out of this is, will I 
i 
the bracket system tend to freeze the gross margins to a greater 
or lesser extent when distributing and handling costs are cleaj,ly 
in a downward trend? I 
Muck has ~een left unanswered in this chapter because it 
was either not within the scope of the thesis or because of the 
lack of adequate data. ~he chief concerR of this chapter was I 
a study of the effeets·of the Glass I milk prioo formula oR th, 
supply and demand for milk. An examination of the positions o~ 
! 
the producers, handlers and consumers was undertaken with no 1 
The :following chapter is l1 
'• 
definite conclusions dra1qn from it. 
devoted to a:m. overall review and tying in together of what ha·s 
been brought out in previous chapters. 
Cka:pter V 
CONCLUSIONS 
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It is quite clear from the evidence presented in Chapter 
that the new Class I milk price formula in the Boston Federal 
Market had not operated i~ such a way as to achieve a desirable 
balance between the demand for Class I milk and the supply of 
milk. For all practical purposes the formula was a failure. 
The inherent weaknesses in the formula were pointed out in Chap-
ter III. Primarily, it was shown that there was a basic incon-
sistency in the objectives set forth by the Boston Milkshed Price 
Committee. That inconsistency was that it is one thing to assurjll 
milk producers a certain income level and am entirely different 
matter to attempt to achieve a desired balance between the supp ~ 
of milk aE.d the demand for Class I milk. It s·eems then that the! 
committee got off on the wro~g foot at the outstart. It wanted 
to achieve two aims which would likely be in direct opposit~oE. 
to one another. 
~he Committee would have been better off had it realize~ 
this and selected one or the other of the objectives. From the , 
point of view of economics, the objective of attempting to mainJ 
tain a balance between the supply and demand ror milk would hav1 
been the preferable one. It is impossible to offer a justifica~·on 
on economic grounds for the objective of assuring all producers 
a o·e:rtain income level. If producers are assured this, there is 
no guarantee that they will reduce production, when a reduction 
in the supply is called for. To achieve a balance between supp]; . 
F 
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and demand under this objective would call for government control 
over production. This would involve many insurmountable admini-
strative problems and it is very likely that it would not be 
acceptable to producers. An attempt at equilibriating supply 
and demand through price changes has certain implications which 
may be undesirable from an ethical point of view. Under this 
objective high cost producers are forced to undertake other 
endeavors in the long-run when market conditions warrant it. 
It can be argued that dairy farmers are not prepared for any 
other occupation and forcing them off the dairy farms because 
they cannot make a living is undesirable from a social point of 
view. However, this problem is not peculiar to only the dairy 
farmer but is found in many fields of economic activity. If 
we were to guarantee all dairy farmers an income sufficient for 
them to remain on their farms, in all fairness we would have 
to give all other groups the same assurance. In doing this, how-
ever, we would not always be allocating our resources in a pro~ 
per manner. 
In all fairness to the Committee, it should be said that 
they were not altogether responsible for selecting these con-
flicting objectives. The Committee, in a sense, was forced to 
include these objectives according to the terms of the Agricul-
tural Marketing Agreement Act. Consequently much of the objections 
to the formula can be traced back to the Act. 
A second error involved in the drafting of the formula was 
the heavy reliance on the accuracy of index numbers for the pur-
pose of pricing milk. The index numbers selected by the Com-
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mittee are merely rough indicators of only a few of these determinants 
of the supply of and demand for milk. The Department Store Sales 
Index was used as an indirect measure of demand. It is believed 
to be undesirable in this respeot : because: (1) the demand for 
goods purchased in department stores and the demand for milk are 
not similar; (2) the sales making up the index are only a small 
portion of total retail sales and consequently constitute a poor 
sm.n-ple; (3) the sales in the index contain charge and installment 
sales and consequently do not represent an accurate measure of 
consumer buying power; C4) even though the index is used as a 
three months' moving average: it has proven to be extremely er-
ratic causing one to believe that it does not accurately repre-
sent consumer buying power; and (5) it does not measure the many 
causes that produce changes in the demand for milk. 
Likewise the determinants of supply have not been accurately 
measured. Only two of the chief costs are accounted for in the 
Grain-Labor Index and other costs may or may not be found in the 
United States Wholesale Commodity Price Index. Some costs are 
measured on the retail level and others on the primary market 
level which is being quite inconsistent. The formula index ig-
nores supply conditions other than production costs and is there-
fore subject to many errors. The determinants of the supply of 
milk are so complicated that it is very doubtful if surficient 
and accurate measures could ever be found that would truly re-
present supply conditions. 
The formula accounts for general economic conditions through 
the United States Wholesale Commodity Price Index. General eco-
nomic conditions to the Committee, it seems, meant the cost of 
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proauction and the cost o~ living to the producer and also the 
general level of consumer income. Several technical objections 
to the United States Wholesale Commodity Price Index were pointea 
out. In addition to this, the Committee expected it to measure 
too many phases. This index which was included in the ~ormula 
index as an attempt to equalize the producer's position with thalj' 
of other groups brings about a con~lict e>f aims which was poin.tJca 
out earlier in this chapter. 
The indices used by the Committee are not only inadequate 
measures of supply and demand conditions but when they are ave-
ragea together are meaningless. It is believed that this pro-
cedure is a violation of goed statistical practices. You can-
not add highly heterogeneous measures of business conditions 
by a number and hope to get an answer which signifies anything. 
In this respect the ~ormula index is composed of wholesale and 
retail prices and a value index. It is difficult to visualize 
what the formula index is after it has been derived. It is mor 
than something which is abstract - it is something which is ex-
tremely nebulous. 
The idea contained in the supply-demand adjustment provisio, 
is the soundest feature o~ the formula. It could have counter- I 
acted the errors resulting ~om the formula index but there are 
so many restrictions upon it that it cannot be effective. It 
permits one single correction ~or a maladjustment in each direc 
tion. If equilibrium is not restored with this one correction, 
supply and demand willcontinue to be out of balance until un-
forseeable conditions such as droughts, increased demand for 
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milk, etc. arise. 
In usimg the bracket system in the formula, there is a rigJI 
dity in the price of milk at the wholesale and retail level. Cor-
petitio~ on the part of distributors is greatly reduced. An in 
ducement to sell more milk by reducing gross margins is greatly 
restricted. 
The seasonal adjustment feature in the formula has worked 
reasonably well. However, it should be considered only as an 1 
experimeut. In time it may be found that Jesser price differenl 
tials will be needed to bring about a desirable seasonal patter ' 
0f production. If producers are made to realize that more even I 
I production of milk throughout the year is more profitable, it 
!I 
is very likely that a lesser price differential inducement will ! 
I be needed to call forth a more even supply of milk from them 
throughout the year. I 
I 
That the prices received by producers under the new formul~ 
I 
were highly satisfactory is shown by the fact that they were ea~ 
ger to accept the formula and have not indicated that they wish~~ 
to have it revised through another Hearing. It was pointed out li 
II in Chapter III that the formula index would tend to overprice j 
Class I milk in the upturn of the business cyole because of the [I 
upward bias in the index numbers themselves in a period of risin~ 
II 
prices and that it would tend to underprice milk in a period of !I 
I 
declining prices. The formula index also would overprice milk I 
i 
under all conditions becauseof the upward bias produced by usingl 
;I 
a remote base period. These conclusions were verified to a grea~ 
extent when the results of the formula were reviewed in Chapter 1V. 
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The large increases in the Class II milk percentages are 
very disturbing. It was found that the surpluses were a result 
to a great extent to the trememdous increase in production and 
to a lesser extent to the decrease in demand. The decrease in / 
demand from the War years is accounted for largely by the preseJ 
adequacy of foods which were rationed during the War and for whi·lh 
milk was substituted; and the decrease in consumer incomes. If 
the retail price of milk had been lower more milk might have been 
I 
consumed, but since the demand for milk is so inelastic it is 
doubtful if much more would have been consumed. The high price 
for milk was principally reflected in great increases in the pro,-
! duction of milk and is what has caused the disturbing influence 
in the market. It is quite clear that the production of milk 
in the Boston Milkshed was too profitable in relation to the de-1 
mamd for milk. The price should have been lowered below its then 
existing level so th~t higher cost producers would have stopped I 
producing and lower cost producers would have reduced their pro-11 
I 
i 
duction. This inference is characterized by seemingly heartless! 
notions but it is very much in line with sound economic princi:plrs· 
It is necessary, if we desire to allow producers freedom in thei~ 
'I 
production decisions and at the same time allocate our resources!! 
in a desirable fashion. !I 
The rest of society cannot tolerate the maintenance of pro-11 
llucers' incomes at a certain level when they are producing morelj1 
milk tkan is required. This surplus goes into manufactured milk, 
products. The products which de ~ot find a market at parity pri~es 
are purchased and stored by the government • In this way the II' 
========~~overnment is indirectly supporting high fluid milk prio~y I 
II 
I II 
i 

A 
zone 
(miles) 
City plant 
41- 50 
51- 60 
61- 70 
71- 80 
81- 90 
91-100 
101-110 
111-120 
121-130 
131-140 
141-150 
151-160 
161-170 
171-180 
181-190 
191-200 
201-210 
211-220 
221-230 
231-240 
241-250 
251-260 
261-270 
271-280 
281-290 
291-300 
301-310 
311-320 
321-330 
331-340 
341-350 
351-350 
361-370 
371-380 
381-390 
391 and over 
APPENDIX A 
Differentials for 
Determination of Zone Prices1 
B 
Class I 
Price Differentials 
( cents :per owt. ) 
t52.0 
14.5 
13.5 
13.0 
11.5 
11.0 
10.5 
10.5 
9.0 
9.0 
8.0 
5.5 
4.0 
4.0 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
No Differential 
-4.0 
4.5 
5.5 
5.5 
6.5 
7.,0 
7.5 
8.5 
9.5 
13.0 
13.0 
14.0 
14.0 
15.0 
15.0 
15.0 
15.5 
15.5 
15.5 
c 
Class II 
Price Differentials 
( cents per owt • ) 
.J38.1 
4.2 
4.0 
3.7 
3.5 
3.2 
3.0 
2.9 
2.6 
2.4 
2.1 
1.6 
1.3 
1.2 
0.6 
0.4 
0.1 
No Differential 
-0.6 
0.7 
0.9 
0.9 
1.2 
1.3 
1.5 
1.6 
1.8 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.8 
2.8 
3.0 
3.1 
3.3 
3.4 
3.5 
i 
1. Federal Milk Order No. 4, as amended effective May 1, 1949, 
Sec. 904."7(c). 
Sec.904.7 
(b) and (c) 
APPENDIX B 
IVJARI{ET ADMINISTRATOR - GREATER BOSTON IviARKETI NG AREA. 
COHPUTATION OF CLASS II l?RICES 
Ma1•ch 1950 
l!eighted average price per 40-quart can of 4o% bottling 
quality cream, f.o.bo Boston, as reported by the U. S. 
Department of Agriculture for the month 
Subtract 
Divided by 33.48 
l1iul tiplied by 3· 7 
Add: 
The average price per pound of roller process nonfat 
dry milk solids for human consumption, in car1ots, 
f.oab. Chicago area manufacturing plants, as reported 
by the u. s. Department of Agriculture, for the 
period February 26 through March 25, 1950 $.1023 times 7.5 
Subtract 
Price per cwt. for deliveries to plants in 
201-210 freight mileage zone · 
Price per cwt. for milk delivered to city plants 
Price per cwt. for !llill>:: delivered to country plants: 
Zone tvliles price Zone Niles Price 
12 111-120 $2.811 ~a 221 ... 2a0 $2.778 13 121-130 2.809 231,...2 0 2.776 
14 lal-140 2. 306 25 241,....250 2.776 
15 1 1-150 2.801 26 251-260 2.773 
16 151-160 2.798 27 26J.-270 2. 772 
17 16J.-170 2.797 28 271"'\'280 2, 770 
l.8 171-180 2.791 29 28J.-290 2.769 
J.9 181-190 2.789 34 331-340 2.757 
20 19J.-.200 2.786 36 351-360 2.755 
21 201-210 2.785 )8 371-380 . 2. 752 
22 211-220 2. 779 
- - -- - - - -
COivll?UTAT~OH OF Bli'TTE;m'AT D IFF.EJREl!T U1 
March 1950 
Sec,904,9(d) i·Teighted average price per 40-.quart can of 4o% bottling 
quality cream, f~o.b. l3oston, as repo~ted by the U~ s. 
Department of Agriculture for the period February 16~ 
through V~rch 15, 1950 
Subtract · 
Divided by 334.8 
Office of iviarket Administrator 
Room 403, 230 Congress Street, Boston 10, Mass. 
A ril 5 1950 
11 
$25.071 
.525 $24:54"b 
$ • 7332 
H. 7123 
.7673 
~ 3.4801 
.695 
$ 2. 785 
$ 3.166 
$25o698 
.525 
*25 '173 ~75 
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ix 
controls in the Boston market up to the adoption of the present 
Class I milk price formula. 
A detailed account of the preparatio~ that went into the 
formulation and acceptance of the formula is presented to deter-
mine which group interests had been the most instrumental in 
its adoption. This account includes the reasoning of the 
framers of the formula., the hearings held on its adoption, and 
the recommendations of the Dairy Branch of the Department of 
Agriculture. Then the mechanics of the formula is described 
in full along with a brief description of other pricing regu-
lations that are included in the Boston Federal Order and are 
specifically related to the Class I milk price formula. 
Conclusions derived from the analysis of the formula are 
based on one principal criterion, which is the attainment of a 
balance between the supply of milk and the demand for Class I 
milk as stated by the framers of the formuLa. The lack of 
complete understanding of producer and consumer responses to 
change in prices, and the dynamic nature ~f the milk industry 
are pointed out as limiting factors to the arrival at a con-
clusive and accurate analysis of the formula. 
The defects of the formula are shown mainly by means of an 
examination of the relationship between the components of the 
formula, and the supply of milk and the demand for Class I milk. 
'This involves, in the first place, a presentation of the limit-
ations of index numbers in general. Then, each index included 
in the formula index is examined as to its appropriateness in 
relation to what it was intended to measure. The bas&., peried 
X 
is scrutini~ed ~rom the standpoint o~ changing real production 
costs and discriminative marketing practices. Other elements 
in the ~ormula are viewed ~rom their tendency to bring about 
11' undue rigidity in the Class I price. 
From this analysis, it is concluded that the components o~ 
the ~ormula index are such that they will tend to overprice 
Class I milk in the upturn o~ the business cycle and will tend 
to underprice it in the downturn o~ the cycle. It was concluded 
in this connection that the 1925-29 base period would quite 
de~initely overprice Class I milk in all phases o~ the business 
cycle. In addition to this, it is believed that the bracket 
system, the contraseasonal provision, and the restrietioms on 
the supply-demand adjustment provision would likely cause rigid-
ity in the Class I price. 
To substantiate the theoretical ~indings, the actual 
e~~ects o~ the ~ormula on the supply o~ milk and the demand tor 
Class I milk ~rom A pril 1948 to March 1950 were reviewed. 
It was ~ound that there had been a -sizable increase in produc-
tion of milk over previous years and that there had been .. a. 
decrease in the demand for milk over the war years. This falling 
o~~ in demand was ~oURd to be due mainly to the decrease in mirJ 
utilization by outside markets. Consequently the percentage of I 
surplus ~ilk to total milk had increased in spite o~ the use 
1 
of the supply-demand provision which had lowered the price o~ 
j Class I milk 44 cents per hundredweight below what was called 
tor by the ~ormula index. 
No attempt was made to compare the relative positions of 
the producers, handlers and consumers under the ~ormula. 
I 
II 
xi 
However, it was shown by the criteria available that the pro-
ducers were relatively well off as compared to pre-war years. 
The handlers' position could not be definitely stated. It was 
found that the handlers "spreads" had increased by i cent to 
1 cent, while the formula was in operation. By and large there 
had been a close correlation between the movement of the whole-
sale price of Class I milk and the resale price of milk. 
It was impossible to present any statistical appraisal of 
the consumer~ position, but it was believed on the evidence 
reviewed that the consumer had not sanctioned the formula. 
Because an excessive surplus of milk had existed during the 
period in which the effects of the formula were studied, it 
is believed that the formula operated in such a way that it was 
unfair to the consumer. The price of fluid milk was placed at 
an arbitrarily high level in relation to supply and demand · 
conditions. Consequently, it is believed that the price of 
fluid milk to the consumer was too high. In addition to this, 
the consumer contributed in the form of taxes to defray the 
government expenses of storing manufactured milk products, 
which were not marketable at government support prices. 
